



Historical Development of the Methodologies of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen And Their Effect and Influence Upon Contemporary Salafee Dawah

Part 4

The Historical Fitnah Of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Penetration Of Its Ideas and Thoughts Into Ahl us-Sunnah

With a History of the Salafee Da'wah in the United Kingdom And the Effects of the Ikhwaanee Methodologies and Its Callers Upon the Salafee Da'wah

PART 4

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Summary of Part 4

The tribulations brought about by way of the deviant methodologies of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimoon and their figureheads, entered the innermost ranks of the Salafees in every place after the Gulf War during the early 90s and onwards, beginning in Saudi Arabia, in the decades prior to this, and then spreading everywhere, following the Gulf War. This triggered off a series of tribulations right until today, all of which were exemplified by way of individuals, groups and organisations who would either adopt and carry, or become influenced by these ideologies, or who would oppose the aqeedah of walaa and baraa' (loyalty and disownment) by not taking and holding the correct Sharee'ah positions towards these fitnahs and these individuals or organisations.

No doubt, great confusion was created with respect to the methodologies of the Salaf in many different areas, and during the mid to latter part of the 1990s and the small beginnings of the 21st century these issues would be clarified by the refutations and clarifications emerging from the scholars during this period. When collectively put together, the sum whole of these clarifications from these Major Scholars, were a concrete refutation of the deviant methodologies that had been entered into the ranks of the Salafees by way of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen, and their puppet spokesmen in Saudi Arabia.

Naturally, during this period, these tribulations affected the da'wah in the United Kingdom, and also brought about localised fitnahs, involving individuals and organisations that had at one time or another, ascribed themselves to the Salafee aqeedah and the manhaj. In reality, this was just an extension of the turmoil and fitnah created by al-Ikhwaan many decades ago, and which had been slowly making inroads into the ranks of the Salafees over the decades.

4.1 Brief Summary of What Has Preceded

To summarise what we have learned so far, we can make the following points:

- 1) The da'wah of Shaykh ul-Islaam Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhaab was a pure da'wah and was built upon the methodology of the Prophets in calling to Allaah and rectifying the servant and the land. Its base and point of origin was to Tawheed and Aqeedah, beginning from correction and rectification in knowledge and action. Hence, it was granted success and its fruits continue to be observed today, and it was on account of this da'wah that many of the Muslims in many parts of the world were guided to Tawheed.
- 2) Due to the results and effects of colonial activity from 1800, and over the next two centuries, as well as the Industrial revolution in Europe and the many social and political upheavals and changes that took place in Europe, by way of certain underlying ideologies and philosophies, generations of "Islamic thinkers" were produced in response to this who tried to aid Islaam, or the Muslims, but unfortunately, they merely adopted the ways of thinking of some of these same philosophies connected to the social, political and economic realm, and were influenced by them to certain degrees. This reflected itself strongly in their writings and methodologies of reform. From this background development, a number of individuals stand out as the ones who were instrumental in paving the way for contemporary and modern political activism, and they are Jamaal ud-Deen al-Afghaanee, Muhammad Abduh, and Rasheed Ridhaa. They had combined influence in Egypt, and upon Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The reformist model of Hassan al-Banna that was based around the improvement of the social, political and economic plight of the Muslims of Egypt and facing up to British colonialism, under the banner of Islaam was exported to other lands. The structural organisation of his movement was based upon the structures borrowed from the movements of the Kuffar, such as Christian youth movements and Freemasonic hierarchical orders of authority, both of which were quite widespread in Egypt at the time. A fundamental feature of his call was to accommodate everybody, every orientation, every sect, under the umbrella of his organisation. This led to a destruction of the affairs of the aqeedah, the destruction of the aqeedah of Ahl us-Sunnah, the destruction of walaa and baraa around this aqeedah and the birth of vile Hizbiyyah that would continue to plague this Ummah till this day, and this mindset proliferated due to the spread of the da'wah of Ikhwaan to other countries, and by way of books, writings, conferences, delegations and otherwise, and by way of organisations and societies that were set up, in all the various lands, over the decades, reaching to the grass-roots level in almost every place, and this collectively, allowed this mindset to engulf the Ummah, and to remove it far away from the methodologies of the Salaf
- 3) Following the emergence of Sayyid Qutb in the 50s and 60s, who was affected by the doctrines of Alexis Carrel and Mawdudi, and whose doctrines of jaahiliyyah, haakimiyyah, takfeer and khurooj were synthesized within the laboratory of Nasserite Egypt. When the ideology of Qutb was unleashed, many Ikhwaanees fled and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. This began in the 1960s onwards. Due to oil boom, many others migrated to Saudi Arabia also. This

eventually led to the importation of the Ikhwaanee ideologies in Saudi Arabia, and from the 70s onwards, generations of youth were produced who were nurtured upon these ideas, culminating in their more open proliferation in the 80s.

- 4) The Brotherhood was responsible for the spreading of two distinct trends of thought, which we have called the Q-Strain and B-Strain of Ikhwaanee thought. These spread to almost all the Muslim lands and also spread to the Western lands from the mid 70s onwards, due to the emergence of organisations of da'wah which were mainly Ikhwaanee in their roots and identity.
- 5) The Jihaadee movement emerged during and following the Afghani Jihaad in the 80s, in which Bin Laden, along with the CIA-ISI alliance, recruited the Takfeeree elements from North Africa to participate in this Jihaad. Many of those who went for Jihaad from the Gulf countries came back with some of the Takfeeree and Khaarijee ideologies and began to call to them in these countries, and began to focus their methodologies of reform around the same priorities of Mawdudi, and Qutb – namely, replacement of governments. This further importation of these ideas augmented and strengthened what had already taken place of the influx of these ideas by way of the earlier migrations of Ikhwaanees into Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries in the 60s and 70s.
- 6) The Gulf War saw the open emergence and precipitation of the da'wah of the Qutbiyyah and Surooriyyah and the Turaathiyyah, who were youth within Saudi Arabia and the Gulf who had been nurtured upon the doctrines of Qutb, Mawdudi, Suroor and others, and they brought with them the Q and B Strains of Ikhwaanee thought into the ranks of the Salafees, and these were exemplified in many principles and foundations that they spread amongst the people, by way of books, cassettes, lectures and otherwise.
- 7) All of this had a great impact upon the Salafees in every place, beginning in Saudi Arabia and extending to all other lands, and it brought massive confusion concerning the affairs of aqeedah, manhaj and da'wah – and it led to the spread of many false principles, ways of thinking, behavioural patterns and otherwise, many of which became the accepted norms and standards within Salafee circles, and the falsehood of which would only become clear in later times, when certain figureheads were refuted by the Scholars, those figureheads who were responsible for the devising and spreading of these refined Ikhwaanee methodologies disguised under the banner of Salafiyyah, and incorporating many false principles and rules, that were in reality, only in support of the Ikhwaanee manhaj.
- 8) During the time prior to the Gulf War and shortly after it, many individuals, groups, organisations emerged and gained prominence in the da'wah, in the Arab lands and in the West, often under the name of Salafiyyah, but who were in reality, affected by the Q and B Strains of Ikhwaanee thought, in their manhaj, their da'wah, their walaa and baraa and otherwise. And this would become clear as one by one, the Scholars of Ahl us-Sunnah, and more specifically the Scholars from Madeenah, at the head of them Shaykh Rabee' bin Haadee, began to address these foreign, deviant methodologies and their propagators.

4.2 Manifestations of the Fitnah of al-Ikhwaan

In light of what has preceded, the da'wah needed to be purified and clarified (of course, this is the case in all times after the first three generations), and the manhaj of the Salaf in the issues in which great confusion had arisen (due to the entrance of the bidahs of Ikhwaan) needed to be made clear. However, this was not to take place except by way of the numerous fitnahs that subsequently came in the way and the refutations and clarifications that followed.

So amongst these fitnahs were obviously the fitnahs that originated this whole matter in the first place (in the decades gone by) and also the fitnahs that were merely and extension thereafter (following the Gulf War and the time after 1995-1996, up until recent times). And all of these fitnahs were clarified and repelled by those scholars whom Allaah has placed in every age, those scholars who are trustworthy and carry the knowledge, and who remove from it the false claims of the liars, the distortions of those going beyond bounds and the false interpretations of the ignorant¹. So amongst these fitnahs:

- a) That of Jamaal ud-Deen al-Afghaanee, the Iranian Raafidee Freemason Heretic, who is the father, the ideological root and source of all modern-day activist, ideological and revolutionary movements. Though he came before the emergence of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimoon by around half a century, his involvements and activities within the Freemasonic “National Society” in Egypt to counter the British influence in the 1870s, was actually a type of precursor model to Hassan al-Banna's Society of the Muslim Brotherhood that was set up fifty years later. Also that of Mohammad Abduh and Mohammad Rasheed Ridaa, both of whom carried aspects of the thought of al-Afghaanee and who were amongst those who had considerable influence over Hassan al-Banna.
- b) That of both Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, the ones who originated the two destructive trends of thought alluded to earlier (Q and B Strains), and

¹ **VERY IMPORTANT NOTE:** An important thing to note is that the refutations of these false Ikhwaanee methodologies that entered into Ahl us-Sunnah did not come from one Scholar alone, but they came from numerous Scholars, over a period of time, and they were isolated refutations but as a whole cumulative. And often you found that only one scholar refuted mainly in an issue that was just one of the many aspects of the problem (such as Shaykh Rabee' refuting Sayyid Qutb, or Shaykh Ibn Uthaymeen refuting CDLR of al-Mas'aree, or Shaykh al-Albaani refuting “Dhaahirat ul-Irja” of al-Hawaali and entering him and his sect into the “Khawaarij of the Era”), and sometimes you found that there were numerous scholars that refuted on a variety of matters (such as what happened with Tawheed al-Haakimiyyah and with the issue of obedience to the sinful, tyrannical rulers, and the issue of the priorities of da'wah, and the issue of cooperating with the Innovators and so on). The point that is being made here is that there was a cumulative refutation of these methodologies emerging when one put together all of the various clarifications that came from the Scholars over the years. And later in this article you will see a list of most of the issues in which clarifications came from the scholars, and which put together collectively comprise a complete refutation of both strains of Ikhwaanee thought, the Q and B strains and the false methodologies entered by way of them, and also a complete refutation of those individuals who were responsible for entering these into Ahl us-Sunnah. It is only when you picture the situation like this that you will acquire insight about this fitnah. Many people took isolated issues from particular scholars at particular times and thus only gained, subjected isolated viewpoints, and this blinded them from seeing the whole picture.

which gave birth to many destructive groups, parties and organisations, over the next few decades, which split the Ummah and entered many trials and tribulations within it. Two main orientations emerged: a) the takfeeri-revolutionary groups such as Jamaa'at at-Takfeer, Jamaa'at at-Tawaqquf and others, who later associated with Jihaad, and b) populist, mass-orientated, democratic-revolutionary, social movement and so on – the main feature of this being accommodating everybody, be he an Innovator, or a Deviant, Strayer or other than that – in order to gain the numbers to create the mass opinion and collective voice to effect societal or Islamic change by essentially political methods, within the framework of the existing political structure. These two trends would also be represented in many splinter groups and specific individuals that emerged in future decades, and remnants of their thoughts carried through to later activists who are mentioned below.

- c) That of Mohammad Suroor, and Mohammad Qutb, and Mohammad al-Ahmari and Mohammad al-Abduh² and others, who were responsible, collectively, at the higher structural and tactical level of orchestrating the in-roads into Ahl us-Sunnah in order to preach their takfeeree, revolutionary manhaj on the one hand, and the manhaj to accommodate all the Innovators on the other, or at least to show ease and lenience to them, to bring them together, to help achieve their goals.
- d) That of their followers and students, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah, Nasir al-Umar, Mohammad al-Qahtanee and others, who were poisoned by the heads of Innovation, such as Sayyid and Mohammad Qutb, Mawdudi, Banna, Suroor and others, and so they unleashed the same two destructive trends of thought (that have their true ideological roots in the philosophies of the disbelievers of the 19th century) into the ranks of Ahl us-Sunnah but in a new more subtle way.³ They are the ones who encouraged and backed the Algerian revolution and gave the doctrinal and emotional support to those

² This is not the Freemason, the Egyptian Mohammad Abduh of the 19th Century, but the one of contemporary times. This one is Abu Anas Mohammad Abduh who is (or was) the director of al-Muntada al-Islaamee, which carries the thought of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen and of the Qutbiyyah and of Mohammad Suroor.

³ It must also be pointed out that what added to the confusion prior to the end of the 1990s was that many of the major scholars did not come to realise the reality of the Qutbi-Bannaawi Complex in Saudi Arabia. Thus, during the midst of the fitnah they had general statements in discouragement of entering these issues and discouragement of speaking against the callers (i.e. the callers to the Qutbi manhaj), and they also had statements in defence of the Hizbiyyeen (due to their husn udh-dhann). All of this was due to not realising what these people were actually upon. In later years, however, these same scholars spoke about them and warned from them, after realising their realities, such as Shaykh al-Albaani (1997) and Shaykh Ibn Uthaimeen (2000), and Shaykh al-Albaani acknowledged that the Shaykhs in Madinah (Shaykh Rabee', Shaykh Faalih, Shaykh 'Ubaid and others) were more knowledgeable of these people than he was. However, many people used the earlier statements of the Major Scholars in order to defend the people of falsehood, and they continue to do so today, often being deceitful, since they know of the later positions of these scholars in refuting the ideas of the neo-Qutbiyyah and warning from them and their cassettes, and they also know of the contemporary statements of the Scholars speaking about al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen and considering them to be Innovators, and outside of Ahl us-Sunnah and from the astray sects.

behind it. And they goaded on some of the Takfeeree groups, who were receiving guidance and direction from the likes of Safar al-Hawaali and Salman al-Awdah and their cassette recordings.

- e) That of Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq and Ihyaa at-Turaath, the one who innovated Shurocracy (mixing the democracy of the Kuffar with the Islamic Shura) and developing and refining the innovation of Hassan al-Banna in a disguised way, and deceiving many Salafees by this manhaj, and continuing to break down the barriers between the Salafees and the groups of innovation and hizbiyyah, and also promoting the Haakimist manhaj of Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi. This took place from the late 70s onwards till the 90s. The organisation of Ihyaa Turaath was a major exporter of the Q and B Strains (qutbitudes and bannaawitudes) in the past few decades, and by way of this organisation, Ikhwanitudes entered very subtly and silently into the ranks of the Salafees in various lands. In reality, the likes of Ihyaa at-Turaah, Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq, Safar and Salmaan, Ar'oor, and others, were "buffer zones", by way of which qutbitudes and bannaawitudes were able to move freely into the minds, thoughts, beliefs and methodologies of Ahl us-Sunnah, by virtue of the fact that these people made an outward ascription to Salafiyah and the Salafee aqeedah, and in the name of aiding and helping Salafiyah. Thus many were drawn to them. And similarly, the likes of Mawdudi, Banna, Qutb, were the "buffer zones" by way of which the influences of the methodologies and political ideologies of the Kuffar, the social and political philosophers of the 19th century, were able to move freely into the minds and thoughts of the Muslims, by virtue of the fact that these individuals set themselves up as spokesmen and leaders for Islaam, and they made an outward display of aiding Islaam and the Muslims (albeit from only political and economic and social aspects), thus many were drawn to them.⁴
- f) That of Abdur-Razzaaq ash-Shayjee⁵ who launched a great assault against one of the Imaams of the Sunnah, the Carrier of the Flag of Jarh and Ta'deel Shaykh Rabee' and caused much confusion and spread many false ideas and

⁴ This is not too different to the likes of Jahm bin Safwaan, and Ja'd bin Dirham and Ma'bad al-Juhane and others, who were influenced by Jewish teachers, or Christian scholars, and Atheistic influences, as a result of which they innovated into the Islaamic Aqeedah what they innovated, into the affairs of al-Amaa was-Sifaat and al-Qadr. And similarly with these contemporaries, they have been influenced by the political and social ideologies of the 19th century Philosophers of Europe and they incorporated aspects of these ideologies into their methodologies, by which they desired to face up to the onslaught of Western domination of the Muslim lands, and the onslaught of Secularism. What was entered into by the likes of Mawdudi, Qutb and Banna, was carried on, in more subtle and acute form, in the later decades, to a people who were not grounded firmly in the methodologies of Ahl us-Sunnah, and were thus affected by these ideologies, which in the times of Qutb, Mawdudi and Banna were promoted under the banner of Islaam, and which in more later times, in recent decades, were championed under the banner of Salafiyah.

⁵ He is a journalist and column writer for newspapers, an extremely ignorant person and who is a staunch supporter of "democratic revolution" (i.e. the methodology of using parliaments, voting etc., as a fundamental method of bringing about change). He has had many columns in the Kuwaitee newspapers in this regard. Shaykh Muqbil described him as a "Safeeh" (fool) in one of his cassettes, and he has been extensively refuted by the Scholars and the Students of Knowledge for his heresies, deviations and enmity against Salafiyah and its adherents.

perceptions about the Salafee da'wah in relation to issues such as groups and movements, Salafees and Jihaad, Salafees and Tabdeeb and so on. He is the one who coined the phrase "Salafiyyah Jadeedah" which would remain a phrase that would be used by all subsequent concealed Ikhwaan, who came out in the name of Salafiyyah, in order to demonise the Salafees, and to make people flee from the Salafee manhaj, its Scholars and its adherents. And he authored a number of books in this regard, which then became the source works for all of the Hizbiyyeen, the outright Takfeerees, the Jihaadees and the Harakiyyeen in general in attacking the Salafees and the Salafee manhaj. Those who used these works included the followers of Safar and Salman, Abdur-Rahman Abdul-Khaaliq, Adnan Ar'oor, al-Maghraawee, and Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi in more recent times.

- g) That of Adnaan Ar'oor, the Arch-Qutbee and Deceiver whom the Scholars refuted and made tabdeeb of, who deceptively tried to teach Salafees manhaj from the books of Sayyid Qutb! Claiming he is only pointing out his errors, when in reality he was a "blazing, drowning Qutbee" trying to enter the deviation of Sayyid Qutb into the ranks of the Salafees. His frustration, jealousy and envy finally culminating in him uttering a word of kufr in mockery of the Salafees saying that "they are the chosen ones of Allaah, whom he brought out of the backside of Aadam"⁶, and we seek refuge from Allaah from the evil of innovations, and their resultant effects upon its people.
- h) That of Muhammad al-Maghraawee, a clear, outright Takfeeree, Khaarijee⁷ who has statements of takfeer worse than those of Sayyid Qutb and more explicit and clear, and whose fitnah reached far and wide. He was led to this state because of his attachments to Ihya at-Turaath and Adnaan Ar'oor and his connections and cooperation with the Qutbiyyeen and others, and these affairs led him to this despicable state. **And this particular fitnah signalled a new era in the fitnahs affecting Ahl us-Sunnah** in that it was the first of a number of fitnahs that began to separate those who had been firm Salafees all along, and who placed value upon the Salafee manhaaj that were being clarified by the Scholars, from those who were manifested something else, of jahl and hizbiyyah and opposing the aqeedah of Ahl us-Sunnah in walaa and baraa (showing loyalty for the truth and its people and disassociating from and hating falsehood and its people), and whose affiliation with the manhaj was shown to be in name only, with no real zeal, or love or attachment, or desire to understand it, and implement it. Thus, this weakness in the foundations, led them to great shakiness and confusion **and when these fitnahs came and got more and more closer to the ranks of the Salafees, they got caught up and**

⁶ This was explained by Shaykh Rabee' in one of his articles refuting the false principle of Adnaan Ar'oor and Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi.

⁷ Shaykh Ahmad an-Najmee declared him a Takfeeree, Khaarijee, saying, when asked about al-Maghraawee, "ar-Rajul Khaarijee Takfeeree", and this is available on audio.

confused with respect to them, and were affected by them and led away from the Sunnah, its Scholars and its people.⁸

- i) That of the more extreme amongst the Qutbiyyah, Takfeeriyyah, such as the likes of Naasir al-Fahd, 'Isaam Barqaawee (Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi), Sulaymaan al-'Ulwaan and Hamood bin 'Uqlaa ash-Shu'aybee, Abu Baseer Mustafaa Haleemah, who only emerged and spoke in times of fitnah, taking advantage of incidents that happen in the Muslim Ummah to come out and win the support of the youth for their underlying Qutbee methodologies, and to incite the youth towards the Harakee manhaj, drawing the youth around themselves. Then they deceive the people, portraying themselves as being the only ones who dare to speak out, and the people then take them as leaders and guides, not knowing and perceiving the inherent deviation in the methodologies and approaches of these people, and that these ideologies are actually Ikhwaanee in their roots and far removed from Salafiyyah. When this occurs, people are drawn towards their extreme underlying ideologies⁹, due to the great emotional nature of the events and incidents that these people monopolise upon in order to call to their manhaj in times of fitnah. This is what happened with this more extreme faction of the Qutbiyyah, and they monopolised on the Algerian crisis and also the aggression upon Afghanistan in October 2001, in order to come out and cause confusion in numerous affairs relating to suicide bombings, muwaalaat and tawalleeh, methodologies of reform, and other issues.
- j) That of Abul Hasan al-Ma'ribi, the greatest and most evil fitnah to date, and which was just a natural progression of the previous fitnahs of al-Ikhwaan. In fact it was a culmination of the previous fitnahs of Ikhwaan. This man is an Ikhwaanee who originally came to Yemen with a devised plot against the Salafee da'wah and the Salafees, and alhamdulillaah, the Scholars of Ahl us-Sunnah finally exposed his evil and deviation and corruption (after great patience), and they exposed his attempts to bring foundations and principles aimed at defending the Innovators and sects, in ways that are more sophisticated and despicable than the way of Hassan al-Bannaa, as they involve greater deception and are more crooked. This fitnah also brought out into the open further differences between the true Salafees who had adhered to the usool of the Sunnah and the manhaj of the Salaf throughout this whole period of tribulation, and who built their walaa and baraa around these usool and manaahij, and between the false claimants, who were in reality upon hizbiyyah

⁸ This is because these later fitnahs came by way of a people (like al-Maghraawee, al-Ma'ribi) who had defence of aspects of the Salafee aqeedah, and had authored works regarding it, and thus, their ascription to Salafiyyah became widespread. However, they had great errors in the aqeedah of walaa and baraa (necessary allegiance and enmity), in its practical implementation, and they opposed the methodologies of the Salaf in behaving with the Innovators, the Hizbiyeen. And this led them, over a period of time to corruption (on top of the corruption they may have already been upon but which had not been made apparent by them), and in the process they took many people away from the Sunnah and into Bid'ah, those who fell into ta'assub and hizbiyyah (partisanship and bigotry), and who were weak and shaky in the usool and the manaahij.

⁹ And some of these ideologies will be looked at, including the one that they often use, relating to Muwaalaat, (making friendship with) the Kuffar, in order to make Takfeer.

and falsehood, and were far away from the manhaj of the Salaf in both knowledge and action, and if not in knowledge, then in action alone, and in walaa and baraa

k) That of the people of the manhaj of Tamyeen', which is a manhaj of compromise, and softening and watering down the manhaj of Ahl us-Sunnah, and departing from it, as it relates to taking stances and positions towards the Innovators and Hizbees, and making walaa and baraa around this, and openly proclaiming these positions and stances. The fitnah of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi brought out and exposed this faction of people, and it also led many of the Salafees to realise that this manhaj of tamyeen' had actually been in operation amongst the people for many years prior to the fitnah of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi, indicating the truthfulness of their observations, that many of the B-Strains of Ikhwaanee thought (bannaawitudes)¹⁰ had become the norms and standards amongst many of those ascribing themselves to Salafiyyah, and that these bannaawitudes would regularly manifest themselves in the speech, action and walaa and baraa of such people.

So all of the collective falsehoods of all of these people, which were nothing but the ripples of the original momentous earthquakes exemplified by the innovations of Qutb, Mawdudi and Banna, that quivered through the decades, were refuted by the Major scholars, and many clarifications and verdicts came from these Scholars which collectively refuted these methodologies and those who were upon them. And the abovementioned individuals were some of the main figureheads that represented this Ikhwaanee infiltration of the ranks of the Salafees in the recent two decades or so.

¹⁰ By way of the spread and proliferation of the da'wahs of the likes of Ihyaat-Turaath, Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq, Salmaan al-Awdah, Safar al-Hawaali, Adnaan Ar'oor, al-Ma'ribi and others from the contemporary Mumayyi'ah (the people of Tamyeen').

4.3 Clarification of the Methodologies of the Salaf

The following is a broad treatment of the various affairs in which clarifications came from the Scholars of the Salafee Aqeedah and Manhaj. The aspect of Ikhwaani thought that each issue is related to (and which has been clarified or refuted) has been indicated after each point by either (**Q-Strain**) for the general ideas of Sayyid Qutb and what followed on from them over the decades and (**B-Strain**) for the general ideas of Hassan al-Banna and what followed on from them over the decades.

4.3.01 Concerning Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna

- a) Refutations of Abu A'laa Mawdudi, and his portrayal of the methodology of the Prophets as violent clashes, revolutions and coups, and that the greatest objective is the Political State – an ideology that would influence those who came after Mawdudi, such as Qutb, Suroor and others. In addition, his deviations in affairs of creed (Q-Strain, even if it originated with Mawdudi, it became famous and more widespread by way of Qutb and his writings).
- b) Refutations of Sayyid Qutb indicating that he was astray, an Innovator, who fell into the greatest of innovations and even had statements reaching the level of kufr and apostasy¹¹, and a refutation of the contemporary Murji'ah¹² who falsely claimed he was “an Imaam of Guidance” and was on a par with Shaykh ul-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah and Shaykh ul-Islaam Muhammad bin 'Abdul-Wahhaab (B-Strain, Q-Strain).
- c) Refutations of Hasan al-Banna indicating that he was a grave-frequenting, milaad-celebrating, Soofee Mufawwidh, and who destroyed the aqeedah of walaa and baraa' for the Sunnah and its people, and whose organisation opened up their arms to all the Innovators, until even the Egyptian Christian Copts (B-Strain).
- d) Exposition of all those who attached to and defended with and made allegiance for these individuals. By virtue of the hujjah that became establishing indicating that these individuals were Innovators, Strayers, those who remain attached to them, and who defend them, and attack Ahl us-Sunnah on account of them, are known, by necessity to be Innovators, Strayers, and People of Desires (B-Strain).

4.3.02 Concerning the Innovators, Their Books and Behaving With Them

- a) Issues relating to refuting the innovators - that it is from the greatest forms of Jihaad (B-Strain).
- b) Issues relating to the books of the Innovators, the rulings pertaining to them (B-Strain).

¹¹ Without this necessitating that the Scholars who refuted this and pointed this out made takfeer of him. No one made takfeer of him, but they indicated the severe calamities that were with him. Amongst those who stated that some of these statements were those of kufr were Shaykh Ibn Baaz (rahimahullaah), Shaykh Hammad al-Ansaaree and Shaykh Saalih al-Fawzaan.

¹² Meaning, the followers of Sayyid Qutb, to whom no sins and innovations can harm in the presence of speech of “Haakimiyyah”, not even mockery of the Prophets or takfir of the Companions, or shaving of the beard or the innovations of the Ash'ariyyah, Jahmiyyah, Qadariyyah and others.

- c) Issues relating to the aqeedah of walaa and baraa (loyalty and disownment) and its practical implementation and its connection to the Innovators and people of Hizbiyyah (B-Strain).
- d) Issues relating to co-operation with Ahl ul-Bid'ah and mixing with them (B-Strain).
- e) Issues relating to judging people and their methodologies by their company and who they praise, defend and ally with (B-Strain).
- f) Issues relating to the methodologies to be followed by the Salafees in certain situations and contexts, such as times of fitnah, and times when the deviation or hizbiyyah of people become apparent, or begin to emerge, and so on (B-Strain).
- g) Issues relating to the difference between Salafiyah and Hizbiyyah in terms of speech and action (B-Strain).
- h) Issues relating to what makes one a Salafee and what signs and factors shows one is not a Salafee or is not with the Salafees (B-Strain).

4.3.03 Concerning Methodologies of Calling to Allaah

- a) Explanation of the fact that da'wah to Allaah is amongst the greatest forms of worship, and thus, the methodologies and priorities of da'wah are restricted to textual evidence (Q-Strain, B-Strain).
- b) Explanation of the difference between devised, formulated methodologies of da'wah (which people bring about) which are termed "manaa hij" (methodologies), and between the use of technology, media resources, and other avenues as tools of da'wah which are newly-arisen and which are termed "wasaa'il" (ways, avenues). The Activists and Hizbiyyeen confuse between the two, often deliberately, in order to legitimise their false, baseless and deviant methodologies that have no basis in the Book and the Sunnah (B-Strain).
- c) Explanation of the fact that calling to Allaah has a starting point, and a succession of priorities before reaching its fruition, and bestowal of success by Allaah (Q-Strain, B-Strain).
- d) Outlining of the actual methodologies of the Prophets, how they began their calls, what their lives were spent in, and refutation of the claims of Qutb, Mawdudi, Suroor, al-Awdah, al-Hawali and other activists, all of whom were poisoned by the revolutionary, political and mass-movement mindset, whose true ideological father was the zindeeq, Jamaal ud-Deen al-Afghaanee (al-Iraanee) ar-Raafidee (Q-Strain, B-Strain).
- e) Explanation of the actual comprehensive, all-inclusive Tawheed that the Prophets called to as opposed to the narrow, restricted, politicised Tawheed of the Harakiyyeen (Q-Strain, B-Strain).

4.3.04 Concerning the Rulers, Takfir of them and Related Issues

- a) Issues relating to Tawheed ul-Haakimiyyah and illustrating the connection of the Harakiyyeen to it, and their goals and objectives behind it (Q-Strain).
- b) Issues relating to takfir of the Rulers and takfir of the sinners (Q-Strain).
- c) Issues relating to rebellion, revolutions, overthrows, assassinations and the likes (Q-Strain).
- d) Issues relating to how to advise and correct the Rulers and not speaking and condemning them in public (Q-Strain).

- e) Issues relating to obedience to the Rulers in that which does not entail disobedience to Allaah and His Messenger (Q-Strain).
- f) Issues relating to the methodologies and priorities of da'wah and the true nature, methodologies and priorities of the calls of the Messengers sent by Allaah (B-Strain, Q-Strain).
- g) Issues relating to the rebellions of some of the early Salaf and clarifications in this regard. Those who rebel are of three types, a) those upon the aqeedah of the Khawaarij, b) those who are the Bughaat (those who revolt seeking power or wealth) and c) those who make a Ta'weel Saa'igh (an interpretation that led them to see the permissibility of revolting in a given situation). And the rebellions of some of the early Salaf were of the third type. Those who argue for revolting as a methodology using the revolts of the early Salaf as a justification are ignorants, innovators, strayers, who do not distinguish between these three types, as is the way of Ahl us-Sunnah, and thus by this confusion, they equate between the contemporary neo-Khawaarij and the Salaf, amongst whom were those who erroneously entered into some revolts. This is done in order to justify their contemporary methodologies of takfir and khurooj. Yet these from the Salaf are innocent and free from neo-Khawaarij, because those from the Salaf, actually made an ijtihaad in a given situation, which later turned out to be wrong and they regretted it afterwards and realised their error, whereas these contemporary Khawaarij try to argue for this way as an actual manhaj, and deliberately confuse between the three types of khurooj mentioned above (Q-Strain).

4.3.05 Concerning Muwaalaat (Loyalty) and Tawallee (Complete Loyalty Inclusive of Love, Complete Allegiance)¹³

- a) Issues relating to Muwaalaat and Tawallee of the Kuffaar, and that there is tafseel (detail) to this issue, as opposed to the absolution of the Khawaarij, who make takfeer by way of it. That there are various types of this form of loyalty to the Kuffar and aiding them against the Muslims, and amongst them are what constitute major kufr and amongst them are what constitute minor kufr (Q-Strain).
- b) Distinguishing between Muwaalaat for the Kuffar on account of worldly reasons, for what is with them of the dunyaa, and between Tawallee, which is inclusive of a love for them, for their deen, turning to them completely with love and satisfaction, and that Muwaalaat for them, when harm is feared from them, so outward Muwaalaat is shown, but without love for them and their deen inwardly, then this is permissible in this circumstance (Q-Strain).
- c) That Muwaalaat has stages and levels and gradations (Q-Strain).
- d) Explanation that loyalty to the Kuffar might be displayed by a Muslim who assists them against other Muslims, out of fear and protection of ones own welfare, and fear of loss of life and wealth or harm from the Kuffar, but not due to love for their deen, and wishing harm upon Islaam and the Muslims, and this is not major kufr – such as what occurred from Haatib bin Abee Balta'ah who

¹³ Muwaalaat and Tawallee refers to the loyalty and support (alongside desertion of the Muslims) shown to the disbelievers in certain times and situations, and which is manifested in different ways.

informed of the Mushriks of Quraish about the military plans of the Prophet (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam), in order to protect himself and his family – but did not do so out of disbelief or apostasy from the religion (Q-Strain).

- e) Explanation that lawful trade and other relations between the Kuffar and the Muslims are permitted (Q-Strain).
- f) Explanation that co-operation between the Muslims and Kuffar has forms, and that if the Kuffar approach the Muslims to jointly fight against what Islaam prohibits, such as drugs, or terrorism, or organised crime, then this is permitted, and if those being sought out for the crimes are Muslims, then the Muslims must specify the condition that the Muslims will bring the perpetrators to justice upon their capture, upon the Sharee'ah law¹⁴ (Q-Strain).

4.3.06 Concerning the Understanding of Jaahiliyyah, and Tawaagheet

- a) Explaining that the general Jaahiliyyah of kufr that existed prior to Islaam no longer exists and was wiped out with Islaam, a refutation of what is claimed by Sayyid Qutb, al-Maghraawee, Ar'oor and those upon his way of ascribing this Jaahiliyyah (of kufr) to Muslim societies (Q-Strain).
- b) Explaining that what remains are traits of Jaahiliyyah amongst the Muslims, not the overall Jaahiliyyah that was removed by Islaam (Q-Strain).
- c) Explanation of the meaning of Taaghoot and that it refers to anything or anyone with respect to whom the limits are exceed in obeying, or following, or worshipping, and that this comprehensive definition covers all things including the Shaytaan, the one who is happy with being worshipped, the deenaar and the dirham, the one who invites others to worship him, the one who claims knowledge of the unseen, the various rules (qawaaneen) of those who negate Allaah's Attributes, they are also taaghoots, likewise every chief or head of innovation, the Innovators, and callers to misguidance, as well as the one who rules by other than what Allaah has revealed, in his aqeedah, or his ibaadah, or his siyaasah (politics), or his hukm (judgement). This being a refutation of those who claim that a taaghoot is the one who does not rule by what Allaah has revealed, and then always portraying the verses in the Qur'aan that require rejection of the taaghoot as a pillar of Imaan to be in reference to those who do not rule by what Allaah has revealed in judgements, as if there are no other types of taaghoots upon the earth, and then trying to portray that the Imaan that cannot be established except in the rejection of Taaghoot is the one that requires takfeer of these rulers, by way of al-Haakimiyyah, and then forcefully removing them (Q-Strain).

4.3.07 Concerning the Methodologies of Jihaad¹⁵

¹⁴ And if the Muslims do not abide by this condition (i.e. by allowing the disbelievers to take them and bring them to justice instead), it still does not necessarily amount to kufr that expels from the religion, rather there is tafseel to this matter.

¹⁵ The Shaytaan came to the Soofees, through the avenue of the "love of the Messenger (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam)" and "love of the righteous" and made them exaggerate in this regard until he led them astray. And people are entered into misguidance through the avenue of something that is from the greatest of virtues in Islaam. In a similar manner, you see many of the people entered into false methodologies by way of their attachment to Jihaad, another one of the great virtues. And this is what

a) Issues relating to the differences between the Jihaad based upon the Book and the Sunnah which admits to levels and types¹⁶, each of which apply to each person, based upon level and capability, whose precursors are the methodologies of tasfiyah and tarbiyah and between Jihaad restricted to aggressions by the Kuffar (which in itself is sanctioned, desired and praiseworthy, is of the most excellent of deeds, and is resorted to due to need) but which is made as an independent, overall methodology of reform, at the general expense of its precursors and foundations, and at the expense of tasfiyah and tarbiyah and the minhaaj of nubuwwah, and which is tainted with elements of the Kharijite doctrine, and the ideologies of Sayyid Qutb and Mawdoodi, and which was mostly undertaken by the remnants of the movements of takfir in North Africa¹⁷ (Q-Strain).

has happened with many of the takfeer groups, and those who have been deceived and misguided by them.

¹⁶ And they are thirteen in number as Ibn al-Qayyim has pointed out in Zaad al-Ma'aad. Refer to IBD170005 @ Spubs.Com for a comprehensive treatment of this subject. And they are:

[A] Jihaad of the Soul

1. Jihad of Learning Knowledge
2. Jihaad of Acting Upon It
3. Jihaad of Calling, Teaching
4. Jihaad of Patience in Calling

[B] Jihaad of the Shaytaan

5. Jihaad of Repelling Doubts
6. Jihaad of Repelling Desires, Lusts

[C] Jihaad of Oppressors, Innovators, Sinners

7. Jihaad with the Hand
8. Jihaad with the Tongue
9. Jihaad with the Heart

[D] Jihaad of the Kuffar and Munaafiqeen

10. Jihaad with the Heart
11. Jihaad with the Tongue
12. Jihaad with the Wealth
13. Jihaad with the Self (the Body)

¹⁷ And amongst those who have explained that the most of who associate with Jihaad in contemporary times are the Khawaarij, those upon the Takfeeri manhaj was Shaykh al-Albaani (rahimahullaah).

The Shaykh was asked, “O Esteemed Shaykh! It is not hidden to you what the Afghani plains contained of the groups and sects of misguidance, which increased in that time amongst its ranks, and which also attempted to spread - unfortunately - their ideologies that are foreign to the manhaj of the Salaf us-Saalih, within our Salafi youth who used to make Jihaad in Afghanistan, and amongst these ideas is the Takfir of the Rulers, and also reviving the abandoned ways, such as assassinations, as they claim. And now, after the return of these Salafi youth to their lands (after the Jihaad), some of them have stood to spread these opinions and doubts between the youth in their own societies...”

And in part of his reply he remarked, “...This point is often forgotten - and its requirement and necessity is often unheeded - by many of those with knowledge [those engaged in the call to Allaah], let alone those besides them who, in recent times have become known as 'Jamaa'at ut-Takfeer'! **Or some of the various types of groups who have associated themselves with Jihaad. However, in reality these groups are but from the remnants of takfeer!!** So these people - and those others - often count themselves amongst the righteous and the sincere, but this alone is not sufficient for a person to be considered, in the sight of Allaah, the Mighty and Magnificent, amongst those who will be delivered and succeed...” (In “Fitnah of Takfir” that was published in numerous books, magazines and newspapers, and which was praised by Shaykh Ibn Baaz).

- b) Concerning the Jihaad of talab (increase), which is performed only in the presence of the unity of the Muslims, and an Imaam to lead them (Q-Strain)
- c) Issues related to the explanation of the fact that the physical Jihaad of talab (increase) is the last in a series of steps, and which is preceded by calling the disbelievers to Islaam, and if they do not accept, then the option of paying the jizyah for safety, and if not then Jihaad is to take place. And explanation of the fact the vast majority of those mixing and confusing the levels and types of Jihaad have not abided by this, and their Jihaad is a narrow and restricted Jihaad that does not proceed upon Sharee'ah priorities and methodologies.
- d) Sharee'ah rulings pertaining to Jihaad, such as whether it is fard 'ayn or fard kifaayah, and the situations in which it becomes fard 'ayn, and reasons for its success and failure, and related affairs (Q-Strain).
- e) Distinguishing between the Jihaad that is embarked upon so that Allaah's word is uppermost and between the fighting for the liberation of one's land, for nationalism or self-autonomy (Q-Strain).
- f) Explanation that the contemporary Jihaadee movement grew out of engineered conflicts which had long term strategic objectives, and most of those employed in these engineered conflicts were the aggressively takfeeree elements of North Africa, who had emerged as a result of the teachings of Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi in previous decades (Q-Strain).

4.3.08 Concerning Suicide Bombings

- a) Explanation of the Sharee'ah ruling concerning suicide missions, and refutations of the doubts used by the Innovators, and an explanation that according to the Book of Allaah, one either kills (in combat) or is killed (in combat) and there is no third category of "killing oneself" in what is perceived to be an immediate and spontaneous combat situation, when in reality it is not.
- b) Explanation that contemporary suicide missions have their roots in the Ismaa'eelee Shi'ah "Assassins"¹⁸ of old, and in Shi'ah fundamentalists circles, which came into Sunni circles after the philosophical writings of Ali Shari'ati (a Raafidee Shi'ite Philosopher of Iran), who wrote a great deal on martyrdom as a revolutionary weapon during the 70s, in order to effect the Iranian Raafidee Revolution¹⁹. The great propaganda given to the idea of martyrdom in Shi'ite

And Shaykh Abdul-Muhsin al-'Ubaykaan who was once with the Qutbiyyah, but then abandoned them after knowing their realities, has recently published a book entitled, "The Khawaarij and the Renewed Ideology", in which he confirms that many of those who went for Jihaad in Afghanistan from the Gulf states, after mixing with the Takfeeris of North Africa, came back upon the ideas of the Khawaarij. And similarly Shaykh Muhammad bin Haadee al-Madkhalee noted the same in some of his cassettes, saying that "they left us considering us to be believers and they came back considering us to be disbelievers."

¹⁸ An extreme sect of the Shi'ah, of the Nizaari Ismaa'eelees who used assassinations and suicide missions to attain political domination against the Faatimid Ismaa'eelees. They were set up in the 12th century CE by Hasan Sabbah.

¹⁹ Refer to his book "Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness", pp. 12, 50-51, 70-76, 89-91, 94. In this book Shariati stresses the importance of martyrdom as a revolutionary weapon, in Shi'ite ideological thought.

ideology, built around the martyrdom of Alee (radiallaahu anhu) and Hussain, cultivated suicidal revolutionary modes of thought amongst the Iranian Youth, that helped to effect the Iranian Revolution as well as provide volunteers for human assault battalions and living land-mine detonators during the Iran-Iraq war in the 80s. This ideology of suicide missions was then adopted by the Hizbollaah of Lebanon (taken from the Shites of Iran) and then moved across into Palestine by way of the Jewish-State funded HAMAS, bringing about even more destruction upon the Muslims (by helping to perpetuate the “state of emergency” required by the Jewish Nazi State to justify its onslaught, massacre and eviction of the Muslims). Other Jihaad movements in different places also adopted it.

- c) Explanation that the resource pool for suicide bombers grew out of HAMAS, a Jewish-State created, supported and funded organisation, created to counter the secular PLO in the 1980s. The continuation of the Jewish State requires a constant state of struggle and emergency, and the HAMAS supported and encouraged suicide bombers provide such a state of emergency for the justification of the policies of the mainly Ashkenazi Communist Jewish Nazi Apartheid state²⁰. Every time political pressure mounts upon Israel and a peace

²⁰ Dr. Henry Makow (himself a Jew) writes, “The Palestinian terrorist “Hamas” movement is a product of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Labeviere, it serves the interests of the Israeli right wing, and has received secret financial support from the Israeli “Shin Beth.” Thus, Palestinian suicide bombers play straight into Ariel Sharon’s hand.”

And in the article appearing in the January 18, 2002 issue of Executive Intelligence Review by Dean Andromidas, there occurs:

“...Speaking in Jerusalem Dec. 20, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer made the connection between the growth of the Islamic fundamentalist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and Israel’s promotion of the Islamic movement as a counter to the Palestinian nationalist movement. Kurtzer’s comments come very close to EIR’s own presentation of the evidence of Israel’s instrumental role in establishing Hamas, and its ongoing control of that organization.

Kurtzer said that the growth of the Islamic movement in the Palestinian territories in recent decades—“with the tacit support of Israel”—was “not totally unrelated” to the emergence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their terrorist attacks against Israel. Kurtzer explained that during the 1980s, when the Islamic movement began to flourish in the West Bank and Gaza, “Israel perceived it to be better to have people turning toward religion rather than toward a nationalistic cause [the Palestinian Liberation Organization—ed.].” It therefore did little to stop the flow of money to mosques and other religious institutions, rather than to schools.

The ambassador’s comments are an acknowledgment of what any serious Middle East observers knows: Hamas has always been seen as a tool by which Israel could undermine the nationalist movement led by Palestinian Authority President and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat. Similar statements by Arafat have been dismissed by Israel as “cranky” propaganda. In an interview with the Dec. 11 Italian daily Corriere della Sera, Arafat said, “We are doing everything to stop the violence. But Hamas is a creature of Israel which at the time of Prime Minister [Yitzhak] Shamir [the late 1980s, when Hamas arose], gave them money and more than 700 institutions, among them schools, universities and mosques. Even [former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin ended up admitting it, when I charged him with it, in the presence of [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak...”

settlement is about to be concluded, suddenly a suicide bombing occurs, and Israel is relieved of any commitments, and a further state of emergency is called, and further aggression and expansion is justified.²¹ Thus, anyone with any intellect will see that the suicide-bombings bring more harm upon the Muslims, and bring more benefit for the Jews.²²

d) Explanation of the issue that there is an exceptional situation that only some scholars²³ speak of in which during the context of an existing military combat,

And Lyndon LaRouche of the Executive Intelligence Review responded to a question put to him by a Jewess in an open lecture, part of which included the following, "Look, and see, the problem is even more complicated--the problem of the case of Hamas: Now, many people in Hamas, including some of those died, are probably honest people, in terms of what they are, as persons. But, I happen to know, that Hamas, as an organization, was created by Ariel Sharon! And I know there's a control in the leadership of Hamas, by Ariel Sharon! So, if, every time that Arafat agreed to a term, and the United States was going to support Arafat on this question of peace, an incident occurred--usually from Hamas. The opinion in the Middle East is--and I support it, because I know Sharon; I know what he is. I've dealt with him in the past: Sharon is the kind of guy, who will find a Palestinian orchestrator to go out and commit an attack, against the Israeli population, in order avoid the embarrassment of being forced to negotiate. How do I know that these poor fellows--how many of them, who bomb themselves, as self-bombers, were not being sent by Sharon, through the Hamas, or similar kinds of agencies? So, why not look at that?"

In 1997, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, published a study, "Hamas: Radical Islam In a National Struggle," authored by Anat Kurz and Nahman Tal. It stated that the Islamic Association, "the platform of which contained no nationalist clauses, obtained a permit from the Israeli Civil Administration in 1979 to conduct its activities. The permit was apparently consistent with the Israeli policy of strengthening Islamic bodies as a counterweight to Palestinian nationalist groups." (January 18, 2002 issue of Executive Intelligence Review)

²¹ Those who support the suicide bombings are from the ignorant fools of the Ummah, and worse than them are the self acclaimed intellectuals, whom Shaytaan has deceived into writing justifications and arguments for these methodologies which are not to be found in the methodologies of the Salaf.

²² Such as the likes of al-Qaradaawee, Salman al-Awdah and Sulaymaan al-'Ulwaan who are amongst the Activists who support and legitimate suicide bombings by false deduction of proofs from texts. Refer to MNJ140004 @ Spubs.Com

²³ This is the viewpoint expressed by Shaykh al-Albaanee (rahimahullaah) in one of his verdicts and is unique to him alone from amongst the contemporary Major Scholars of the Salafee Manhaj. And if we accept this viewpoint and ijtihaad, the actual conditions that the Shaykh lies down are not actually fulfilled in those places where suicide bombings are taking place, such as in Palestine. Because no large number of disbelievers are killed, only handfuls, and in return many more Muslims are killed. And further, there are no large Muslim armies, that have military strength, and all of this is a speculative and investigative matter, subject to prevailing conditions and outcomes in battle. As for the proof for contemporary suicide bombings then they have no basis or evidence in the Book or the Sunnah or the Seerah of the Sahaabah. And the Harakiyyeen have taken the likes of this verdict from Shaykh al-Albaanee, and took it out of the context that is contained within the verdict and have used it to strengthen the Harakiyyeen and their methodologies. Rather, the likes of these people only strengthen the expansionist policies of the Jewish State, and the suicide bombings are actually encouraged by them. And this is what happens when people leave the Salafee manhaj and enter into aql and ra'i, they support methodologies that actually bring more harm upon the Muslims, and yet they are so blinded and think that in their support of these methodologies they are championing the cause of Islaam. They are ignorant of the fiqh ul-waaqi' of the worldly affairs, as well as the fiqh ul-waaqi' of the Islaamic Sharee'ah rulings.

death is inevitable with absolute certainty, and thus, under orders of the commander of the army, a person may enter into a “suicide mission” to harm the enemy, however, this is in the context of the existence of the backing of a large Islamic army with a leader, and is subject to the tactical decisions of the overall leader, not in the context of isolated individuals, or groups of individuals blowing themselves up in random and then inviting more wrath, aggression, murder and bombing upon other innocent Muslims, in the absence of any real military and physical strength.

- e) Explanation that the Qur'aan mentions only the virtue of those who “...**fight in Allaah's cause, so they kill (others) or are killed (by others)**...” (Tawbah 9:111) in battle and not “those who kill themselves”!
- f) Explanation of the difference between fighting for the raising the word of Allaah, which is Tawheed, and suicide-bombing due to anger for the sake of ones land and country.
- g) Refutation of the Qutbiyyeen such as Salman al-Awdah and al-Ulwaan and others from the Harakiyyeen who argued with falsehood in attempting to justify suicide bombings, and who twisted and distorted many of the texts and many of the battle incidents in Islamic History, in order to satisfy the sentiments of the ignorant and common rabble who had rallied around them, and in order to justify and support the false manaahij of the Harakiyyeen (Q-Strain).

4.3.09 Concerning Fiqh ul-Waaqi' – Current Affairs

- a) Explanation of the real intent behind “fiqh” and “waaqi”, and distinguishing between having a thorough understanding of a situation (such as a fiqh or sharee'ah ruling) before passing a judgement in it (i.e. in the affairs of the deen) – which is what is actually meant by “understanding the state of affairs” as explained by Ibn al-Qayyim and between the distorted “fiqh ul-waaqi” of the deceived politicians of the Ummah who portrayed it as monitoring, recording, analysing and forecasting, based upon the reports of the disbelievers, their magazines, newspapers, and variety of Jewish-owned media outlets, reading the Tawrah, developing conspiracy theories from the visions in the Old Testament and its commentaries and other than that. (B-Strain, Q-Strain).
- b) Explanation that being aware of the Kuffar and their plots and plans is only for the firmly-rooted, deeply-skilled Scholars of each age, who are senior in age and knowledge and not for the excitable upstarts, who flogged conspiracy theories, and enthralled the youth with the prophecies of the Tawraat²⁴, and other such foolishness that caused them to become a laughing stock, and who busied and

²⁴ And amongst such people was Safar al-Hawaali who was amongst the flag-bearers of the Fiqh ul-Waaqi of the deceived politicians of the Ummah. The situation reached such a level that he prophesised 2012CE, as being the beginning of the end of the state of the Yahood, after giving preference to a particular interpretation of the vision of Daniel amongst the many existing interpretations that can be found about the prophecy of Daniel. The year 2012CE is significant to the Mayan pagans and is chosen by many Occult and other conspiracy groups to signify the time of momentous events that would shape the future of civilisation. This shows the great heresy that is with these people, and in their methodologies and in their knowledge, and how innovation and its people led these individuals to become misguided and misguiding others – while the people deceived by them thought they were champions of Islaam while their knowledge comes from nothing but 'aql and ra'i and is far away from the Book and the Sunnah and methodologies of the Salaf.

directed the attention of the youth of the Ummah away from the real and true beneficial knowledge of the Book, the Sunnah upon the understanding of the Salaf. (B-Strain, Q-Strain).

4.3.10 Concerning Political Work, Democracy, Elections

- a) Refutation of Abdur-Rahmaan 'Abdul-Khaaliq's innovation of Shurocracy, mixing the concept of Shoora in Islaam with the Democracy of the Kuffaar and refutation of his multiplicity (i.e. pluralism) of groups and parties within Islaam (B Strain).
- b) Refutation of the so called "Political Work" being enjoined upon the youth, in the name of "collective work" and "co-operation between Muslims" both in the Muslim lands and the non-Muslim lands and which contains opposition to the manhaj of the Salaf due to it entailing hizbiyyah and containing many harms to the deen and to the dunyaa (B Strain).
- c) Clarification of the truth regarding entry into elections (and their falsehood as a general methodology of reform), and clarifications of the views of some of the Scholars, who in specific circumstances, with conditions and guidelines that are investigative and speculative, permitted entry into elections in a given situation (B Strain).
- d) Explanation of the many harms and forms of corruption that arises from entry in parliamentary elections and many of the inherent oppositions to the Sharee'ah that it contains such as considering the Sharee'ah to be deficient, submitting to secular statutes, destroying the unity of the Muslims (in the Muslim lands), using wealth for unlawful purposes, giving birth for hizbiyyah, falling into lust after leadership or seeking it, which is forbidden, making empty promises to please the people, the harms it has upon people's Imaan as they slowly start to compromise, and so on (B-Strain).

4.3.11 Concerning Affairs Related to Jarh (Criticism) of the Innovators

- a) Refutation of the principle of Hassan al-Bannaa concerning co-operation and pardoning (B-Strain).
- b) Issues related to jarh (criticism) and ta'deel in general and disparagement of the innovations and innovators in this regard (B-Strain).
- c) The Issue of the bid'ah of al-Muwaazanah (B-Strain).
- d) The incorrect claims of not refuting openly except after advice and claiming this unrestrictedly without tafseel (B-Strain).
- e) The claim that before one disparages (makes jarh), or accepts this disparagement from someone else he must see, hear and feel for himself, which is a Communist manhaj, taken from the Jews, who wanted to see Allaah directly before believing (B-Strain).
- f) The claim that before we expel someone or criticise him there has to be an ijmaa' (unanimous agreement) (B-Strain).
- g) Issues related to Jarh and Ta'deel and how to reconcile between conflicts with respect to them, and issues related to Jarh Mufassar, that it is obligatory to be accepted and the conditions required for it to be overturned and rejected (B-Strain).

- h) The slogan of "we do not blindly follow anyone" which was used in order to reject the verdicts of the Scholars concerning the people of innovation, deviation and hizbiyyah, and this principle filtered down to affect the Salafees in every place, such that they began to speak with it and employ it (B-Strain).
- i) The slogan of "we correct but do not criticise or destroy" and "and we refute the innovation, but not the person", and "we desire a vast, wide manhaj for all the Ummah" and other such slogans by which accommodation of Ahl ul-Bid'ah was intended (B-Strain).
- j) The slogan of "referring the mujmal (general) back to the mufassal (specific)" and applying this in a way other than what is correct, and using it to defend outright statements of innovation (which are not classed as mujmal to begin with, but as baatil, i.e. falsehood) (B Strain).
- k) Clarifying the confusion made by many people, even those who ascribe themselves to the sciences of hadeeth, when they mix between the jarh and ta'deel related to the subject of narrating and reports of the narrators of hadeeth, and between the subject of refuting the opposer and refuting the Innovator (B Strain).
- l) Clarifying the fact that Jarh is a precise methodology that has helped to defend Allaah's deen from innovation, and corruption and from being lost, and that Jarh is not abrogated or restricted to the hadeeth narrators, and that it will continue so long as innovation continues (B Strain).

4.3.12 Concerning the Jamaa'at and Working With Them and Related Issues

- a) Prohibition of multiple Jamaa'ahs and that there is only one Jamaa'ah and that whatever opposes this one Jamaa'ah, which is Salafiyyah, then it is innovation (B-Strain).
- b) Concerning co-operation with the groups and Jamaa'ahs of bidah and hizbiyyah, that it is forbidden, and that the base origin and foundation towards Ahl ul-Bid'ah is hajar (boycotting) and absence of cooperation (B-Strain).
- c) That mixing with the Hizbiyyeen and Ahl ul-Ahwaa and the general people who are upon something of innovation, is with the conditions of a) intending to call them to the Sunnah and to leave their deviation and b) having 'ilm (knowledge) and baseerah (insight) in what one is calling them to and taking them away from, and that general mixing that is devoid of this is not permitted (B-Strain).
- d) Concerning voting, elections and parliaments, and entering into the democracy of the Kuffar and working with the Innovators in this regard, and using this as a complete manhaj of reform – the explanation that all of this opposes the Sunnah and the Manhaj (B-Strain).

4.3.13 Concerning the Positions and Levels of Scholars of the Sunnah and Knowing How To Reconcile Between Their Viewpoints

- a) Issues related to the role and position of the Scholars, knowing their levels, specialities in knowledge, and giving each one the due right, recognition and respect that he deserves, and not lowering one below his true position, and not raising one above his true position, and realising that scholars differ in their specialities (Q-Strain, B-Strain).

- b) Issues related to the Major Scholars being those who are most senior in their age, have grey, white or orange beards, are deeply-rooted in knowledge and have great experience, and that these are the ones who are made fundamental referent points in the affairs that befall the Muslims, and that they are the ones around whom the general overall da'wah to Islaam, the Sunnah and Salafiyyah, revolves (i.e. they are the ones who perform it, and those below them, follow them in it and are directed by it) (B Strain).
- c) Issues relating to the true methodologies concerning how to reconcile the apparent differences between the Scholars when they give conflicting viewpoints on issues, especially relating to individuals and groups, and this was in fact related to the issues and methodologies of Jarh (disparagement) (B-Strain).

4.3.14 Concerning Taqleed and Ittibaa'

- a) Explanation that the people are of three types, the Mujtahid, the Muqallid and the Muttabi', and that the Muttabi' has the ability to follow rulings with the ability to understand their evidences, but does not have the ability to actually derive the rulings.
- b) Explanation that Ijtihaad is divisible and can separate into parts, and it is possible for a person to make Ijtihaad in some matters as opposed to others.
- c) Explanation that Ittibaa' is that in which the hujjah is established, hence, the Qur'aan and the Sunnah, and the Ijmaa' of the Sahaabah is hujjah, and likewise, when the scholars unite upon a matter, it is a hujjah.
- d) That from taqleed is that which is permissible, and it is permissible for the Mujtahid to make taqleed when he is incapable of ijtihaad in a matter for valid reasons, and for the Muttabi' and for the Muqallid taqleed is permissible with conditions, amongst them that the Muqallid is ignorant and incapable of knowing the ruling of Allaah and His Messenger (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam), and that he makes taqleed of one who is known for rectitude, and knowledge and ijtihaad from the people of knowledge, whilst noting that taqleed of a single person or single madhhab in all matters is prohibited, and likewise that taqleed of the one about whom it is not known that he is fit for taqleed is prohibited, and likewise that taqleed in a matter in which it has become clear that it opposes the truth is prohibited.
- e) Refutation of the Innovators and Hizbiyeen who claim that following the rulings of the Scholars upon the Innovators is taqleed – and especially those Hizbees who accuse the Salafees of making taqleed of Shaykh Rabee' (B-Strain)
- f) Refutation of the Innovators and Hizbiyeen who make independent ijtihaad obligatory upon every single person as it relates to taking the judgements of the Scholars concerning the Innovators and those who deviate – this coming from the direction of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi (B-Strain)
- g) Explanation of the doubt of the Hizbiyeen who confuse the issues of riwaayah (reports) with the issues of ahkaam (judgements), and enter the subject of the taqleed into both of these matters, attempting thereby to make the people flee from taking the rulings of the Scholars upon the Hizbiyeen and Innovators,

which are actually from the angle of riwaayah to begin with, and are not related to the issue of taqleed (B-Strain)²⁵.

4.3.15 Concerning Jarh (Disparagement), Ta'an (Revilement), Tabdee', Radd (Refutation), Tahdheer (Warning), Naqd (Criticism), Mulaahadhhah (Observation), Naseehah (Advice) and Bayaan (Clarification)

- a) Making a distinction between the science of al-Jarh wat-Ta'deel as it relates to the narrators of hadeeth and the rulings upon the chains of narration, and between the subject of refuting the opposer (ar-radd 'alal-mukhaalif), and that there are points of departure between these two types of knowledge, and that the claim that a person must be versed in the science of al-Jarh wat-Ta'deel before he can make inkaar of the Munkar is from the evil innovated principles of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi and the Party of Tamyeen with him, who wish to nullify the principle of "inkaar ul-munkar" and refutation of the people of innovation (B-Strain).
- b) The permissibility of disparaging the Innovators and reviling them and passing judgements upon them, and this is with respect to the clear Innovators and Innovations, those that are known by all the Salafees, such as the Raafidah, the Jahmiyyah, the Mu'tazilah, the Soofiyyah, and likewise the Jamaa'at of Innovation and Hizbiyyah, such as al-Ikhwaan and at-Tableegh and Hizb ut-Tahreer and Jamaa'at ut-Takfeer and others, upon whom the Scholars have judged with innovation and misguidance (B-Strain).
- c) The permissibility of refuting the Innovators and Hizbiyyeen for anyone who has the qudrah (ability) and the understanding of the Sunnah and the understanding of the manhaj, and to make inkaar (rejection) of their opposition to the Sunnah, and that this is general for everyone, who has qudrah and fahm, because this is a matter that is related to the affairs of Imaan and Tawheed and Aqeedah and Walaa and Baraa' (B-Strain).
- d) It is permissible for the Salafees in general to refute and make inkaar of the affairs that are clear and known, those that every Salafee knows, and which have been spoken of and refuted by the Scholars already, and as for the deep and

²⁵ These last three points are B-Strain because the one who spread them, Abul-Hasan al-Misree, intended to make the people's acceptance of the judgements of the Scholars upon the Hizbiyyeen and Innovators to be made difficult, and to challenge their judgements and to make the people themselves to be the judges over these rulings, in that they make their own decisions as to what they will take and not take from the rulings of the Scholars – all in the name of avoiding taqleed. And this is great misguidance.

Ibn Taymiyyah said, "That which the majority of the Ummah are upon is that Ijtihaad is permissible in general and taqleed is permissible in general. They do not obligate Ijtihaad upon everyone, and make Taqleed forbidden, and nor do they obligate Taqleed upon everyone and make Ijtihaad forbidden." (Majmoo' al-Fataawaa 20/203). Imaam Ahmad, "And the one who claims that he does not hold taqleed (to be permissible) and that no one should make taqleed of anyone in his deen, then this is the saying of a faasiq in the sight of Allaah and His Messenger (sallallaahu alaihi wa Sallam), and he merely desires to nullify the narrations, and to negate the knowledge and the Sunnah and to become independent in his own opinion and rhetoric, and innovation and difference". (Tabaqaat al-Hanaabilah 1/31).

difficult matters and the newly-arising issues, then they are only for the Major Scholars (B-Strain).

- e) A Salafee whose usool (foundations) in aqeedah and manhaj and da'wah are sound, and who makes walaa and baraa' around all of that, and is precise in his manhaj, and then makes a mistake due to ijtihaad, then his mistake is refuted, and corrected, in private if made in private and in open if made in the open, whilst maintaining respect and reverence for him, because due to his usool being correct he will surely recant from the mistake, knowing that he genuinely made a mistake, and it is not permissible to make tabdee' upon him or disparage him in person, for that genuine mistake that arose for him (B-Strain).
- f) As for the one whose usool in aqeedah and manhaj and da'wah are not sound, and who does not make walaa and baraa' around the usool – which is the case with the Innovators, and is from their characteristics – and he errs, then his error is refuted and he is also warned against (B-Strain).
- g) It is permissible to make tahlid, and to make mulaahadah, with respect to the mistakes that occur from within the Salafees, without this necessitating that this is a jarh upon the person in question. Rather, this is a form of naseehah, and bayaan that is necessary to lessen the spread of error and deviation (B-Strain).
- h) The acknowledgement that it is possible for a Salafee to leave Salafiyyah and to enter into bid'ah by just one or two mistakes that he makes, if they are mistakes which are in the usool, the aqeedah the manhaj (B-Strain).
- i) A Salafee who begins to deviate and whose usool in the aqeedah or manhaj or da'wah begin to become corrupt, and after his errors are refuted and explained to him he proceeds to makes walaa and baraa around his errors, then his mistakes are warned against, and the people warned from him, from being affected by him, and his affair is taken to the scholars, and tabdee' is not hastily entered into, without reference to the Scholars and a judgement from them (B-Strain).
- j) The necessity of distinguishing between all these matters (jarh, tabdee', ta'an, radd, naqd, naseehah, bayaan, tahlid, mulaahadah), and that they are not all synonymous with "jarh" or with "tabdee'" and are not always connected necessarily, or exclusively to the outright Innovators alone (B-Strain).

4.3.16 Concerning al-Walaa and al-Baraa (Necessary Allegiance and Enmity, Disavowal)

- a) Explanation that al-walaa and al-baraa', has levels and degrees, beginning with baraa' from the Kuffar and Mushrikeen, then from the groups of innovation and the misguided sects, then from the sinners from Ahl us-Sunnah, and as for walaa' then it is for the people of Islaam, and it varies according to the extent and level to which a person is upon the Salafee aqeedah and manhaj or is far from it. So those who are closest and most rigid in adhering to the Sunnah, the Aqeedah and the Manhaj, they deserve the most walaa and they are the Scholars, the Imaams, the People of Knowledge in each time who teach and spread Salafiyyah, the Salafee aqeedah and manhaj, and whoever follows them and is with them upon this adherence and firmness (B-Strain).

- b) Explanation of the importance of building al-walaa and al-baraa' around the aqeedah and the manhaj and the holding of correct Salafee mawaaqif in the tribulations, and in the rulings upon the Innovators and Hizbiyyeen (B-Strain).
- c) Explanation that the innovation of tamyee' (laxity in the manhaj), and aspects of the B-Strain of Ikhwaaniyyah arise partly from not implementing the issue of al-walaa and al-baraa' correctly and being lax and indifferent in choosing one's company, and befriending and allying with people without looking at whether a person is or has been upon the usool of the Salafee way, the Salafee manhaj, and the correct Salafee mawaaqif (B-Strain).

4.1.17 Concerning Tamyeen and the Mumayyi'ah

- a) Tamyeen (literally "softening, melting") is a later expression of the manhaj of Hassan al-Banna and his principle of cooperation with everyone, that manifested itself in recent times amongst the ranks of the Salafees, due to what came upon them of innovated principles and methodologies by way of a people wearing the outer garment of Salafiyyah, but huddling the undergarments of Ikhwaaniyyah (B-Strain).
- b) Explanation that softening and melting of the methodologies of the Salaf towards innovations, towards the innovators, the hizbiyyeen, those who deviate, and towards holding correct Salafee positions and building walaa and baraa around them, is something that was and is still found amongst many of those claiming ascription to Salafiyyah (B-Strain).
- c) Cooperating with the hizbiyyeen or those known for no clarity in the manhaj, by sitting on their platforms and performing da'wah work alongside them (B-Strain).
- d) Prolonged company and sitting with the hizbiyyeen or those with unclear methodologies until it begins to affect ones speech and behaviour (B-Strain).
- e) Prolonging the giving of advice to the innovators and the hizbees longer and far beyond what is actually necessary and sufficient (B-Strain).
- f) Not being careful in choosing one's company (B-Strain).
- g) Thinking that a Salafee cannot ever leave Salafiyyah (B-Strain).
- h) Corruption in walaa and baraa, and not building it around the correct Salafee positions with respect to the tribulations and misguided Innovators and with respect to the Salafees whose deviation away from the Sunnah²⁶ becomes apparent and in the open, but running to them, making excuses for them instead (B-Strain).
- i) Claiming that a person must just learn the truth and not busy himself in knowing the deviant methodologies and that by just learning the truth, the falsehood will become clear to him by itself (B-Strain).
- j) Claiming that refutations and refuting harden the hearts and that this is all that the Salafees are involved in²⁷ (B-Strain).

²⁶ Such as the likes of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi and his followers, like Abdul-Qadir Baksh and Abu Usaamah ath-Thahabee and others.

²⁷ And this is one of the great slanders upon the Salafees, those who actually combine between teaching the truth and warning against what opposes it. So you see that the Salafees are involved in teaching the books of Tawheed, and the books of Aqeedah and the books of Manhaj and the affairs of

- k) Claiming that one can hold the right Salafee positions but still behave how he wants, and mix with who he wants, and that this will not affect them in the least, such as those who after the Scholars declared al-Maghraawee an Innovator, still made ta'assub for him, and after the Scholars declared al-Ma'ribbee an Innovator, still made ta'assub for him, and who proceeded in setting up Jam'iyyaat and showing laxity and lenience with the Hizbiyyeen. And this is a form of separating beliefs from actions, believing that one can hold the right Salafee positions, but that they have no impact or influence upon one's behaviour, and one can behave however he likes, as long as he merely knows the true positions in his heart, and thereafter he can behave how he likes in his da'wah, and mu'aamalah and walaa and baraa. (B-Strain).
- l) Claiming that one can acknowledge the right Salafee positions in the various tribulations and concerning the Hizbiyyeen, but at the same time still have hatred and dislike for other Salafees in general (often due to personal reasons, or more often due to baseless reasons, just jealousy and hate)²⁸ (B-Strain)
- m) And there are many other manifestations that the Scholars such as Shaykh Rabee', Shaykh 'Ubayd al-Jaabiree and Shaykh Faalih have explained and outlined

4.3.18 Judgements Upon the Some of the Contemporary Hizbiyyeen, Harakiyyeen and Ashaabul-Ahwaa Who Carried the Q and B Strains of Ikhwaaniyyah into Salafiyyah

- a) The refutations upon the neo-Qutbiyyah of Saudi Arabia, Safar al-Hawaali, Salmaan al-Awdah and others, being declared as "Khaarijiyah Asriyyah" by Imaam al-Albaanee; their imprisonment being sanctioned by the Ha'i'ah Kibaar al-Ulamaa; their cassettes being warned against by Shaykh Ibn Uthaymeen and who also explained the deviation of takfeer of the rulers to be one that relates to 'aqeedah, and that those who fall into takfeer today are from the inheritors of the Khawaarij; Shaykh Saalih al-Fawzaan indicating Takfeer in the statements of Salmaan al-Awdah and refuting the general methodologies of the Qutbiyyeen in many of his fataawaa; the many refutations of Shaykh Rabee' bin Haadee upon Safar al-Hawaalees deviant and crooked manhaj, and likewise refutations upon Salmaan al-Awdah.
- b) The refutations of the Mashaayikh of the Da'wah Salafiyyah upon Muhammad Suroor and his manhaj of takfeer and khurooj and his secret partisanship.
- c) The refutations of the scholars upon Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq and upon the Jam'iyyah of Ihyaa at-Turaath
- d) The refutations of the Scholars upon Adnaan Ar'oor, the Arch-Qutbi.
- e) The refutations of the Scholars upon the manhaj of Ahmad Sallaam

Fiqh and Ibaadah and Sulook and at the same time, they also engage in what is required especially in these times in warning from the evil, and from the innovations and from the Innovators and the Hizbiyyeen in order to make the Salafee way distinct.

²⁸ Such as what happened with some of those got caught up in the fitnah of al-Ma'ribbee and then afterwards claimed a recantation, but who continued upon hatred and enmity towards the Salafees who were clear from day one. All of this is from tamyee' and from not valuing the manhaj and not loving and hating for its sake, and is from corruption in al-walaa and al-baraa'.

- f) The refutation of the Scholars upon Suhayb Hasan
- g) The refutations of the Scholars upon Mohammad al-Maghraawee of Morocco.
- h) Refutations of the Scholars upon the likes of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisee, Abu Baseerah Mustafaa Haleemah, the Syrian Takfeeree and others
- i) The refutations of the Scholars upon Abdul-Hasan al-Ma'ribbee, the Dajjal (Extreme Liar) of the Jazeerah
- j) And refutations of many others in the past decade who did not gain as much prominence as the abovementioned but still played their role in the propagation of the Ikhwaanee methodologies and deviations.

So the isolated, yet progressively collective refutations of all of the Salafee Scholars, over those years, brought clarity in all these issues, and the effects of the two original earthquakes exemplified in the bidahs of Mawdudi, Qutb (political-violent-revolutionary) and Bannaa (populist, democratic, political, collective power and voice of the masses) – and the subsequent ripples that sent shockwaves through the decades, finally making deep in-roads into the Salafees in the late 80s and early 90s and doing much damage to the manhaj of the Salaf and the usool of the Sunnah – were repelled, and some rebuilding was done, and the wall that divided the people of the Sunnah from the people of desires and hizbiyyah and jahl was rebuilt and fortified, slowly but surely. Every fitnah that came, that of Safar and Salmaan, that of Ihyaa at-Turaath, that of Ar'oor, that of al-Maghraawee, that of al-Ma'ribbee, then the realities of Salafiyyah, and the methodologies of the Salaf became clearer and more apparent, by way of these fitnahs. The usool and methodologies of the Salaf and their action-based necessities were slowly revived, due to the clarity that emerged following the refutation of individuals and organisations and after the exposition of their falsehood by the Scholars, over a period of many years.²⁹

²⁹ This was for those who were granted success in patiently following these affairs, and learning and studying. And many people were left in a state of utter confusion and being led in many directions, due to their ignorance and indifference and lack of any real zeal to arrive at the truth, and due to their not being able to envisage the broader, wider perspective and picture of what had taken place historically, and due to not placing any value or importance to learning the affairs of manahij (methodologies) in the various fields of knowledge and action.

4.4 The Fitnahs in the United Kingdom

And then there were specific fitnahs here in the UK (and likewise in other lands), all of which were actually parallel to the abovementioned fitnahs (mentioned in 4.2), and they occurred as a direct result of these fitnahs, and were connected to them and were a necessary by-product of these fitnahs.

- a) That of the collection of clearly identifiable Ikhwaanee organisations, groups and individuals who carry the ideas and thoughts of Qutb and Banna and Mawdudi in the West, such as the Young Muslims, the Jamaate Islaamee, FOSIS, ISNA (in the US) and numerous others in the various countries, together with all the publishing houses and bookstores, and other bodies, which collectively, maintain the Ikhwaanee status quo in the Western lands, and serve as the mechanism through which Ikhwaanee paradigms of thought in da'wah and manhaj are spread and entered into the minds of the youth.
- b) That of the Jihaadee movement that emerged in this country following the Afghanistan War and the conflict in Bosnia. Introductions to and the writings of Abdullaah Azzaam and interactions with individuals who had partaken in the fighting in Bosnia, and who returned to this country and began calling to the methodologies they had acquired abroad, gave acceleration to the creation of Jihaadee social networks. The presence of individuals such as Abu Hamza al-Misree, and others from the North African states in this land, and activities including publishing and authoring, aided the proliferation of the Jihaadee manhaj, and overwhelmingly those who were drawn to the Jihaadee manhaj, were those who were not nurtured at all upon the Salafee aqeedah, or manhaj, and had very little knowledge of it. This made it easier for them to take wholeheartedly what came as part and parcel of the contemporary Jihaad movements, the doctrines of takfeer and al-haakimiyyah and khurooj, that originated with Sayyid Qutb, without them being able to realise the inherent dangers and deviations in these ideologies and their departure from the Salafee manhaj and aqeedah. Further, since Jihaad, in the context of conflicts in Muslim lands is a very emotive affair, then once people are nurtured around these matters, and they adopt methodologies that are built upon this emotive foundation, it is very hard for them to alter their methodologies and ways of thinking, due to the powerful underlying emotions that these methodologies are tied to. And speaking about these individuals is not a belittlement of Jihaad, as these people do not have any monopoly over Jihaad and nor do they represent it in its true form and in its true order of priorities, and in the form that the Prophets and Messenger implemented it, from its foundation to its peak. Rather, this movement emerged, as was pointed out earlier in this treatise, after recruitment campaigns targeted primarily at the groups of Takfeer by "CIA-BinLaden-ISI" in the Afghanistan War, and was partly bankrolled through the BCCI, and their involvement in Jihaad was not rooted in the call to Tawheed and the defence of the Islamic Aqeedah, the Salafee Aqeedah, and nor did it arise and emerge with a pre-determined intent to call to Allaah from this

perspective³⁰. Rather, it was “mobilised” by external factors, for particular objectives³¹ and those who were mobilised for it, by the majority, were not upon the Prophetic methodologies in da'wah and rectification, rather they were upon the methodologies of the Khawaarij, those of Qutb and Mawdudi. The entry of the Jihaadee movement into the da'wah scene in this country was also another medium through which qutbitudes were proliferated further, not so much within Salafee circles, but amongst the general Muslims. This added further confusion within the da'wah, and led to some amongst those who ascribed to be Salafiyyah to be led into confusion regarding the issues of Jihaad and the methodologies connected to them.

- c) That of Abu Muntasir and his Hizbiyyah organisation, JIMAS, who was originally upon Qutbiyyah³², Bannaawiyyah, and then after having a brief affair with the “doctrinal, knowledge-based Salafiyyah” and the da'wah of Shaykh al-Albaani in the early 90s, then withdrew back to his underlying Qutbiyyah and Mawdudiyyah, due the effects of Ali at-Timimi, Muhammad Ismaa'eel and others upon him.
- d) That of Ali Timimi al-Qutbi³³ who entered much confusion by preaching the very same destructive doctrines of Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaliq, Mohammad Qutb and Safar and Salmaan in his so called “Advice to the Salafees of the UK” (1996)³⁴, and subsequently launched a series of ideological assaults against the

³⁰ This in no way negates that individuals who went for Jihaad, that there is due upon them whatever there is due upon them of reward from Allaah, so long as they fought for His pleasure, however, we are speaking here from the point of view of the emergence of the Jihaadee movement as a whole, which had its origins in these conflicts and not in a generalised da'wah beginning with calling the people to Tawheed and the Salafee Aqeedah, and abandoning what opposes it, which is where the call and Jihaad of Shaykh ul-Islam Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhaab began. So raising the points that have been raised above, then this if from the angle of contrast, it is by way of comparison, in pointing out the roots and origins of the emergence of movements.

³¹ And alongside that we make it clear that the Afghani Jihaad, as the Scholars of Ahl us-Sunnah explained was a legitimate Jihaad.

³² Abu Muntasir was upon the manhaj of Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi and the precursor to JIMAS was essentially an Ikhwani youth organisation. In 1989 in one of his conferences he was making takfeer of the rulers and calling for khurooj against the rulers, and this is recorded on video-tape and has been witnessed. He briefly encountered the Salafee aqeedah for a few years which gave his organisation some slight direction but only from the theoretical perspective, but later, due to the influence of the likes of Ali at-Timimi, Muhammad Ismaa'eel of Egypt (a Qutbee) and others, he continued in the general direction he was already upon before the 1990s, and thus naturally he took to the ideologies of Safar and Salmaan and Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaliq which were those of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Bannaa.

³³ Ali at-Timimi was poisoned by some of the Innovators of IANA and due to his connections with unsavoury characters, of the Ikhwani persuasion, he transformed. This led him to subscribe to the teachings of the Qutbiyyah and to begin reading Mohammad Qutb and Safar al-Hawaali, and later on he would become an instrumental mouthpiece for both the B and Q variants of the Ikhwaani Manhaj, finally culminating in him accusing Imaam al-Albaani to be upon the Irjaa' of Jahm ibn Safwaan (as narrated and admitted by some of his followers) and accusing the Salafees as a whole to be Murji'ah.

³⁴ The infamous lecture of Ali at-Tameemee given in Leyton, London in early 1996, was actually an attempt to push the Salafees of the UK towards the manhaj of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Bannaa, by

Salafees in the years to follow, using the writings of the caller to democracy, Abdur-Razzaaq ash-Shayjee.

- e) That of Jamal Zarabozo, the self-styled evaluator of the fiqh positions of the major scholars, who comes out making himself out to be a muhaqqiq and on a par with these major scholars, and who is also amongst the Harakiyyeen, the followers of Safar and Salman and du'aat of the Haakimiyyah first propounded by Mawdudi and then fused by Qutb with Alexis Carrel's concept of "barbarism" within the context Christian societies. Zarabozo is not from the people of knowledge, nor is he from its students, but he is one who attempts to resemble them, but is not from them. His circles of movement are amongst the Surooriyyah, Qutbiyyah and the Harakiyyeen. And as for what is often done by the likes of these individuals of refuting the Ikhwaan, then know that within the Ikhwaan there are multitude of different orientations, and just because a person might refute one orientation that is found, does not mean he is free from other orientations. So for example, within Ikhwaan you have those who at one extreme include even the Christians as "believers" and call toward unity of religions (Qaradaawee, Turaabee and others) and then on the other hand you have those who make takfeer of the Muslims and nation states (Qutb and those upon his way). And you have Sufism, Modernism, and many other facets within the Ikhwaan, and this is because of the nature of this vile party, this vile sect and it is the fruits of the activism of Hassan al-Banna. So just because a person refutes the Modernists, does not mean he at the same time is not amongst the Harakiyyeen and not upon the some of the other deviant methodologies which also have their roots in the cess-pit of Ikhwaan. So it is necessary to be aware of this reality, and this also applies to many others, who got taken from the direction of the Ikhwaan, that just because they defend aspects of the Salafee aqeedah, or even isolated aspects of the Salafee manhaj, it does not save them from being upon misguidance and innovated methodologies in other arenas.
- f) That of al-Muntadaa al-Islaamee, an organisation set up by the contemporary Mohammad Abduh, who is its director and Mohammad Suroor. Al-Muntadaa al-Islaamee is the vehicle by which the pseudo-Salafees ("the Ikhwanified Salafees") push their da'wah and their methodologies. Following the tensions that arose after Mohammad Suroor came out with his true and real da'wah after the Gulf war, making takfeer of the rulers of Saudi Arabia, and making takfeer also of the Scholars, al-Muntadaa al-Islaamee made an overt display of

way of the Kuwaiti Declaration that came mainly from the affiliates of Ihyaat-Turaath. This declaration contained generalised statements speaking about the importance of co-operation between Muslims, ruling by what Allaah has revealed, the affairs of the Ummah and other issues – all of which, at a general level, with such a generalised wording, no one would object to and find fault with. This allowed people like Alee at-Tameemee to read what was not actually to be found therein, such as "Tawheed al-Haakimiyyah" as a fourth and independent category. However, what was actually behind all of this was the methodologies of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, which Ihyaat-Turaath and Abdur-Razzaaq ash-Shayjee and others were promoting and spreading, by way of "Tawheed ul-Haakimiyyah", and by way of calling for co-operation with the groups of innovation and misguidance such as Tableegh, Ikhwaan and Hizb ut-Tahreer and others, and by way of entry into democracy and parliaments as a general method of reform, and by enjoining and innovated form of "Fiqh ul-Waaqi" upon the youth of the Ummah.

separation from Mohammad Suroor and breaking any apparent ties from him (in order to avoid bad publicity in Saudi Arabia), despite maintaining these connections secretly. This also saw Mohammad Suroor and Mohammad Abduh proceed along two paths in their magazine publications, with Mohammad Suroor publishing "as-Sunnah" and Mohammad Abduh in charge of "al-Bayaan". Both these magazines were used to bring about ideological change amongst the youth in the Gulf countries specifically, and by way of that ideological change to work towards the objectives, first laid out by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb decades earlier. This movement became known as "the Surooriyyah", and its operational base was right here in London, UK (interesting how all the activist revolutionaries and neo-Khawaarij are harboured by the British). Unfortunately due to the politics played out by al-Muntadaa, many people are fooled by what this organisation is really about. But let it be known that this organisation is a Hizbee organisation, and its top level operatives and administrators are the likes of Mohammad Suroor, Mohammad Abduh, Mohammad al-Ahmaree and others who came from the Ikhwaanee academy and then entered amongst the Salafees, under the guise of defence of the Salafee aqeedah (as evidenced in their magazines before the Gulf War), and then when they got their following and the trust of the people, they came out with their real agenda. And organisations such as al-Muntadaa, and IANA (the Islamic Assembly of North America) are merely front organisations – which operate as charities, run schools for children, and colleges, and are involved in da'wah work – by which individuals, groups, networks and societies are called to the Ikhwaanee Manhaj. They make an open display of an attachment to the Major Salafee scholars; however this is only in doctrinal issues (i.e. related to aqaa'id). As for methodological issues, then they are upon the methodologies of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, the neo-Qutbiyyah such as Safar and Salmaan, and those of the Ikhwaan in general. Unfortunately, there are many hundreds, if not thousands, of unsuspecting people who either work with them, or hold a good opinion of them (i.e. these organisations) thinking them to be Salafee, without them realising the origins and roots of these organisations, the people behind them, and the agenda that they are actually serving. The model of operation of these organisations is similar to the model of operation exemplified in the Muslim Brotherhood apparatus.

g) That of Abu Aaliyah³⁵, the self-styled mujtahid, man of false usool and many faces who pushed himself forward to speak on the fitnah of Ihyaat-Turaath, thinking he knew what was better for the da'wah in this land, than the Shaykhs who were more aware of this fitnah, and how to deal with it. So he stuck out his head, and peaked his nose and began speaking in affairs that were not in need of his likes, extracting and inventing his own usool in order to deal with the

³⁵ Abu Aaliyah is another veteran of the JIMAS farce. Essentially personal issues led him to break off from Abu Muntasir, but in reality they were different sides of the same coin, the only difference being that Abu Muntasir was more shrewd and intelligent in his dealings than Abu Aaliyah. Abu Aaliyah's confusion in the affairs of manhaj were apparent by around 1997, and this would later lead to him to openly support and defend the Qutbiyyah and reveal his connections with Alee at-Tameemee, Safar al-Hawaali, al-Awdah and others.

issues, and in the process beguiling and misleading many sincere people (in London and other areas) who would not have known any better, given the circumstances, and due to their placing trust in people whose realities were not clear to them, they remained, a fair number of them, in confusion until this day. His realities became clear in 1996-1997 when the issue of Ihyaa at-Turaath arose, and the affairs of Suhaib Hasan became more clear to the Salafees, and his jahl and following of the hawaa also was made very apparent³⁶.

- h) That of Suhaib Hasan who is upon an Ikhwani manhaj, and whose cooperation with the Ikhwanis became clear, and his false positions in manhaj and usool and fiqh made apparent, and he in reality was not calling to the major scholars, but to himself, and again he spoke on the issue of Ihyaa at-Turaath whilst being ignorant of its realities³⁷ and then speaking ill of the scholars in the process, such as Shaykh Rabee' and Shaykh Muhammad al-Madkhalee and others. And his gatherings are those of the Ikhwaanees and his associates are Ikhwaanees, and his da'wah is Ikhwaanee so he is entered amongst them, in accordance with the precise Salafee manhaj³⁸.
- i) That of a collection of individuals from London and High Wycombe³⁹, who were connected to Abu Aaliyah and who implemented the manhaj of Abu Aaliyah of "independent ijtihaad", meaning that when these essentially Ikhwaanee fitnahs opened up and spread, then despite the fact many of the Salafees conveyed and transmitted the rulings of the Scholars in various issues of manhaj (such as those upon Ihyaa at-Turaath, and Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq), they decided that they must "find out for themselves", and make their own ijtihaad. This is no problem if they were fit and capable of ijtihaad in these issues of manhaj in the first place, but in reality they were oblivious to the true state of affairs, and thought they could independently arrive at the truth in this manner. These people were oblivious to the actual realities of the Salafee da'wah, and they made loyalties and allegiances in the 90s, during the times of confusion, which they found hard to break (such as loyalties to Suhayb Hasan

³⁶ More will be said about Abu Aaliyah later on in this treatise.

³⁷ Shaikh Muhammad al-Madkhalee said: "I am more knowledgeable of Ihyaa' Turaath than him [Dr. Suhaib], and more knowledgeable of ten of his likes - rather [more knowledgeable] than a whole world full [of the likes] him. For we know the Jam'iyyah perfectly and completely and we are neither in need of him, nor of his likes and he will not increase our knowledge of the Jam'iyyah except like the drop in an ocean, it will not have any effect if it is removed or added. So we know the Jam'iyyah perfectly well. We know it in Kuwait and outside of Kuwait - **and it is not Salafiyyah** - even if it is claimed for it, that it is Salafiyyah - even if it adorns and beautifies itself to our respected Shaikh and Father [i.e. Shaikh Bin Baaz] and shows the face of Salafiyyah to him, for soon there will come a day when its reality will be unveiled. **And our Salafi brothers who have abandoned it - then they are more knowledgeable of it than those besides them - and the testimony of the one who knows and is informed has precedence over that of others...**" In a tape recording on the 4th January 1997 - questions pertaining to Shaikh Suhaib Hasan's attacks on some of the Scholars.

³⁸ More will be said about Suhayb Hasan later on in this treatise, and his bannaawitudes will be explained.

³⁹ These individuals who were upon the manhaj of Tamyeen in those times, years ago, which the Salafee Scholars refuted and exposed in some detail in the past few months.

and his sons, and to Abu Aaliyah and others), and when clarity began to emerge in later times with respect to the methodologies, these individuals, remained upon the nurturing they had received previously, and thought they could “independently research” and arrive at the truth – in issues and matters that were way beyond them. This manifestation really only appeared within London and High Wycombe and it had its conceptual roots in Abu Aaliyah, and was passed on to those connected to him. In reality, this phenomenon was actually one of the aspects of the manhaj of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi, and has parallels to the principles that al-Ma'ribi brought of “at-tathabbut” and “not falling into blameworthy taqleed” and others.

- j) That of al-Hidaayah, the hidden Hizbee private business whose profits came under threat when the Salafi Bookstore was opened close by, and who plotted and planned in secret in order to destroy Maktabah Salafiyyah, and who have allegiances and alliances with the Ikhwanified Markaz Ahl ul-Hadeeth group (where their roots lie), and they also have strong ties and connections to those known for confusion with Qutbiyyah and Surooriyyah and Turaathiyah like Tawfique Chadhury and Yasir Qadhi⁴⁰ and others. And connected to their fitnah is that of Israar Khan the owner of Hamd House, who alternates between repenting for his slanders and his evil plots against the Salafees at one time, and then after his repentance, working against the Salafees and plotting plots shortly afterwards once more. So he moves from one to the other with what indicates his confusion and deception and great shakiness in character and in the constitution of his mind. This faction is connected to and has ties to the Abu Aaliyah and Suhayb Hasan network.
- k) That of the self-acclaimed “Shaykh” Faisal al-Jamaykee. This mentally-unstable individual displayed extreme and severe qutbitudes, making takfeer of the Salafees as a whole, nullifying their marriages, and implying that their wives live in sin, likening them to the munaafiqeen of the very first times, inciting the ignorant to go out and kill non-Muslims in the non-Muslim lands and many other affairs. The doctrinal roots of this man lie in Safar al-Hawali, Abdur-Razzaq ash-Shayjee and others from the Qutbee-Bannaawee complex, and much of his talk was the same as that of ash-Shayjee's, claiming that the Salafees deny Jihaad, that by their obedience to the tyrannical, sinful rulers in what does not entail disobedience, they have taken them as lords besides Allaah, that they reject all the Jamaa'at, and make takfeer of them and so on. Within the UK, this individual had little followers, however, as with all Innovators, their beautified speech can often be appealing to the ignorant, and outside of the UK, he did generate some interest for his short-lived call. Currently, he is being held by British police due to incitements to violence made on cassette,

⁴⁰ Even though these individuals may deny that, but it is their jahl that does not make them realise that in the times of fitan, that they traverse the path with the Qutbiyyeen and Surooriyyeen, and their viewpoints and positions and walaa and baraa all of them tend towards the Qutbiyyeen and Surooriyyeen, but because of their jahl they don't realise this, and are deceived into thinking that they are free of that. And this is because of their jahl they have no criterion (furqaan) to distinguish between this and that. And the connections of some of these to the likes of Jamal Zarabozo makes clear the general orientation that these individuals are actually upon.

urging Muslims in the UK (and elsewhere) to stage assassinations and partake in forms of terrorism⁴¹.

l) That which became known as the Contract of Hizbiyyah which was laid down for those who followed it and abided by it by the now Ikhwaanee Innovator, Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribbee. **In reality, from that day, the Salafees in the UK were divided into two.** a) Those who walked out of that farce of a meeting, feeling hurt and wronged, and knowing that injustice had been done, and that the contract was not correct and they were the firm Salafees, and they had these feelings due to the natural "Salafee" instinct that they had acquired due to their giving importance and attention to actually getting busy and learning the aqeedah and the manhaj of the Salaf over the previous few years and implementing it in their da'wah and walaa and baraa, b) Those who secretly (and openly) rejoiced with this contract, claiming victory had been attained, and the brothers in Birmingham and those with them upon the same manhaj from various other cities had been "dealt with". The Ghullaat ul-Mutahazzibah, namely Abdul-Qadir Baksh, actively tried to unite the Salafees around this contract of Hizbiyyah. In reality, the separation between the firm Salafees, who had been nurtured upon the aqeedah and the usool and the manhaj of the Salaf and who had been implementing it in their da'wah and their walaa and baraa, and between other than them, actually took place by way of this momentous event, the Hizbee contract of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribbee. Despite all that the firm Salafees had patience for a couple of years, until the realities came out and the truth known. This contract of Hizbiyyah, was the first of three major issues that signalled the emergence of the open difference between those who adhered to the Salafee manhaj firmly in the years prior, knew it and understood it and oriented themselves around it, and those who were upon shakiness, and aspects of hizbiyyah. The other two issues were the fitnah of al-Maghraawee and the fitnah of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribbee.

m) That of Abdul-Qadir Baksh, and Abu Zur'ah al-Leebee of Luton⁴² and the people of Hizbiyyah with them, who have been the worst of all the previous ones, the most treacherous, and the most lowly and despicable of them all, and the worst in blatantly promoting and defending innovation and its people and viciously assaulting the Salafees, defaming them, spreading lies and slanders about them, and working to bring them and their da'wah down. And Abdul-Qadir is a Dajjaal, Affaak, Saahibu Hawaa⁴³, Jaahil, Safeeh, a Seeker of Baatil⁴⁴,

⁴¹ Then more recently, he got sentenced to 9 years imprisonment.

⁴² And Abdul-Qadir Baksh confirms that his very close friend, Abu Zur'ah al-Leebee is one that lies, and who makes numerous lies, and wilfully and deliberately lies, and Abdul-Qadir Baksh knows this and he has textually written this.

⁴³ Shaykh Ahmad an-Najmee said that "perhaps this man is an Innovator, like him (Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribbee), or greater than him."

⁴⁴ And no one lied upon this Abdul-Qadir, rather his written and verbal statements were merely presented to the Scholars, and in light of their insight and erudition in these affairs, and in the wider context of the fitnah of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribbee, they immediately recognised this man for what he

and this is the ruling of the scholars upon him, word for word, such as Shaykh Faalih al-Harbee, Shaykh Rabee' and Shaykh Ahmad an-Najmee. And no one caused more harm to the Salafees in recent times than this Daal Mudill, especially on the Internet, when his website became the reference point for the outright Takfiris, Qutbis, Ikhwanis, Ihya at-Turaath Hizbees and enemies of the Salafi Da'wah, in attacking the Salafees and the manhaj of the Salaf, and in attacking Shaykh Rabee', Shaykh 'Ubaid al-Jaabiree, and Shaykh Ahmad an-Najmee. He has gathered together, by way of his destructive actions, all of the Hizbiyyeen and Ahl ul-Ahwaa, and given them tools and resources to further attack and defame the Salafees, and for this reason, Shaykh Rabee' upon learning of some of this, labelled him a "Safeeh" (Idiot, Fool).

n) That of Abu Usamah ath-Thahabee, a confused individual whose true nature and his shakiness was known to some amongst the Salafees back in 1997, but it was a time when the people would never have accepted any speech about him. And this also shows that the Salafees are the most patient of all people towards the confused and shaky individuals who work against the da'wah (whether they actually realise it or not) and who spread destructive ways of thinking in the minds of the youth, and it shows that the Salafees weigh the benefits and harms and are not hasty in matters. Most recently, he played a dual role with his Luton counterpart, Abdul-Qadir in spreading mischief and corruption by attacking the major scholars implicitly and defending the Innovator of Ma'rib, Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi, in his cyberspace communications and paltalk piffles. He unleashed the labels of "Ghullaat", "Muqallidoon", "Muhqiboon", upon the Salafees, merely because they adopted the correct Sharee'ah position towards the Innovator that he was defending and whose manhaj he was poisoned by. Previously, in the UK, during 1997 whilst the Salafee brothers were trying to unite everyone up and down the country, upon the aqaa'id, usool and manaa hij of the Salaf (in agreement with the advice and direction they had taken from the Shaykhs) Abu Usaamah was going up and down the country advising everyone to remain independent, and not to be tied to anyone, and to be unique in the da'wah. And this was a great evil, it played a role in what sowed the seeds for the Salafees in different areas to separate and drift away from each other. This naturally, had an impact on the da'wah, since the clarity that the firm and clear Salafee brothers wished to share with everyone else in the country, and around which they wanted to unite them together, was not to be attained due partly to the effects of the personal doctrines of Abu Usaamah. Instead, people drifted (by way of this philosophy of Abu Usaamah), and then they made certain events, issues, and incidents that took place to be the deciding factors in the formulation of their positions towards the Salafees who were clear⁴⁵, and this continued to shape their positions, and outlooks, until this day. In addition to

was. All these labels have come from the Scholars, after they read some speech of Abdul-Qadir in an article he wrote in order to lay down corrupt principles so he could defend Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi.

⁴⁵ That is, instead of taking the methodologies of the Salaf and clarity in the da'wah and holding the right positions towards the opposers, to be the basis of their positions and walaa and baraa – which is what the Salafees were trying to achieve.

all of this, it is also firmly established about Abu Usaamah that he even called for independence in the issues relating to da'wah away from the Scholars, as some of the Salafee brothers in America have explained about him, from his tapes and his statements and other than that. Amongst the people of knowledge are those who have ruled that he be boycotted and warned against just like the rest of Ahl ul-Ahwaa are warned against, due to his defence of the Innovator, Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi and his harsh attacks upon the Salafees, and that he is counted amongst Ahl ul-Bida', and is a Strayer, leading others astray by way of what he has fallen into.

- o) That of many groups of people (in different lands) who for years, remained upon ignorance and confusion, and continually took erroneous stances and continually sat on the fence, and out of their own ignorance claimed to be "balanced" and in the "middle", whereas in reality, they were upon the behavioural pattern known as tamyee' (which is soft, melted version of Salafiyyah, which assumes that you can hold whatever positions you like and work with whoever you like, and make your walaa and baraa' upon whatever you like and all of this will not affect your Salafiyyah) and they did not fill themselves up with knowledge, nor send brothers to the Scholars to learn so that they could come back to this land and teach them the usool and the manhaj, and so they remained in this state. It was actually this category of people who would later kindle the fitnah of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi al-Ikhwaanee in the West, and cause much turmoil by not adhering to the Major Scholars of the Ummah. A fair portion of those that constitute this faction of people (spread across Europe and the US) continue to this day in their political games, attempting to save face for their history of shakiness and many mistakes on the one hand, and on the other attempting to portray the firm clear Salafees as being those who cause mischief and tribulation. Many of these individuals also began to spread doubts about specific Salafee brothers by going on to the platforms and website forums of the Hizbiyyeen, from the followers of Ihyaat-Turaath and Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi, and then they began to create mischief and aid and support the people of innovation and hizbiyyah (the followers of al-Ma'ribi) by giving them lies and misconceptions and conjectures by which they could eat the flesh of the Salafees in every place who adhered firmly to the truth in this particular fitnah.
- p) That of a people whose da'wah is actually a da'wah, or a behavioural response that is built upon the principles of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi **without them actually realising and knowing that**. Certainly, there are many people like this, whom we have experienced directly, and they have remained in this compound ignorance, not knowing, and not knowing that they do not know, because of the complete indifference to the affairs of manhaj. It would not be an exaggeration to say that filling the stomach, or the delights of the world, or acquiring wealth were of more interest and created more excitement and zeal in a fair number of these types of people, than arriving at clarity and purity in the manhaj, and from this angle, they were led to the current state that they are in, one of mass confusion, and not knowing who to believe and who is upon the truth. And likewise those people who during times of fitnah, and during times when the reality of the deviation and corruption and hizbiyyah of certain

people, or their mischief becomes clear, show all forms of leniency and excuses for the people of fitnah, but not showing anything of the sort for their Salafee brothers. And claiming, "both sides are right" and other such buttery nonsense and foolishness.

Similar individuals and organisations existed in other places such as the USA, where people like Abu Muslimah and certain organisations such as QSS played their role in propagating the same confusion, by way of the same fitnahs that had their roots in the Ikhwaanee ideology, and more pronouncedly in recent times, that of Abul-Hasan al-Ma'ribi.


Know that the problem with all these people was in Usool (fundamentals), they oppose the Usool of Ahl us-Sunnah in their da'wah, and the way they conduct it, and their manhaj and their siyaasah and mu'aamalah, and fahm (understanding), and in their manhaj of behaving during the times of fitan (tribulations), and in the issues of Ijtimaa' (being united)⁴⁶ and the issues of Iftiraaq, and in walaa and baraa', and in the issue of referring the fitan (tribulations) and affairs of da'wah back to the major scholars, and in knowing how to deal with the apparently conflicting views of the scholars.

And there are probably many other localised fitnahs in different areas, but this is just by way of example and illustration, and these are perhaps the most obvious and well-known fitnahs and the ones that had the most effect or continue to have some effect. And the reality was that these people did not truly understand what had occurred to the Salafee manhaj and the Salafee da'wah, and when the tribulations came to them, they were not able to remain firm and steady, and they got caught up in them. This was proven by their actions and behavioural responses during these times and their walaa and baraa.

⁴⁶ When the behaviour and dealings of certain people are such that they cause splits within the ranks of the Salafees and they act upon nothing but impulses and personal grudges, then this is behaviour which opposes the usool of the Sunnah. Refer to Shaykh Ibn Uthaimeen's explanation of the Six Principles of Shaykh ul-Islam Ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab, in his explanation of the second principle related to being united and not differing and splitting, in which he brings the ahaadeeth of brotherhood, indicating that unity relates to aqaa'id (beliefs), manaa hij (methodologies), and mu'aamalaat (dealings), and ukhuwwah (brotherhood). Thus, those who cause mischief amongst the Salafiyeen, and harm the ukhuwwah are those who cause splits in the deen. This is even regarding ukhuwwah, so what then when it also involves issues of manhaj?

4.5 The Q and B Strains – Influences and Effects

Amir Nayif bin Abdul-Azeez, the Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia said, “I say without any hesitation that all our problems came from the direction of the Muslim Brotherhood” (as-Siyasah Newspaper Interview, November 2002), and he has spoken the truth, for all the problems to enter Ahl us-Sunnah, the Salafiyyeen, came from al-Ikhwaan. We can summarise the very broad concepts of the Q and B Strain of Ikhwaaniyyah as follows:



And the methodologies that constitute these strains spread and proliferated over the decades, due to the factors we covered earlier in this treatise. The Salafee da'wah in the UK emerged from this confusion, and many of these methodologies had become the norms and standards. However, much of that confusion remained and is still to be found today, and it remained because of laxity and indifference on behalf of those who entered Salafiyyah from the point of view of aqaa'id and fiqh and ibaadah, but who did not pay any attention to correcting the manaahij and purifying them from what became

the norms and standards during those times. And this is what led many of those from the UK who have been mentioned above to go astray and to become confused and to fall into some of these methodologies, or remnants of these methodologies, when there emerged people who began to spread and teach them, but unfortunately, in the name of Salafiyah.

Just as a reminder, here is the saying of Shaykh Rabee' bin Haadee that we quoted right at the beginning of this treatise, "Then laxity and softness (tasaahul) occurred, and then those hurling (violent) torrents returned, with evil, innovations, misguidance and Shirk. Then Allaah brought the Imaam, the Mujaddid, Muhammad bin 'Abdul-Wahhaab to repel them from the Ummah, and so he assaulted the people of innovations and misguidance and attacked them with evidences and proofs and with the sword and the spear, until he returned the strength to Islaam, the illumination back to Tawheed, and the splendour and purity back to the Sunnah. Then Ahl ul-Bida' wal-Ahwaa prepared their strength, and they unsheathed (their swords) in the darkness, and they did not come out openly like their predecessors, but they came under the veil of humbleness, and under the veil of Salafiyah. Then they began to spreading their venom, like spotted vipers, slowly but surely, gradually, and using plots, machinations, and deception, all under the veil of having jealousy for Islaam, and under the veil of the obligation of cooperation between the Muslims against their enemies amongst the Christians, Jews, the Modernists and Secularists. And they were spreading their venom through lessons, and books, and by way of shiny, lustrous slogans and methodologies, which pounced upon a great many hearts from the young ones, the youth, and even the old ones. And from the fruits of their plot and their aforementioned methods were small works, and books and positions (that they held in issues)." End of quote.